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Article 2

Equal Rights in Retrospect
Deborah L Rhode*
An objective common to much legal and historical research is, in
L B. Namier's phrase, "to achieve an intuitive sense of how things do not
happen." To that end, this article examines a particularly illuminating
sequence of failures.
In March 1972, Congress overwhelmingly endorsed an Equal
Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution providing that
"[e] quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any state on account of sex."' At that time, the prospects
for early and uneventful state ratification seemed overwhelming.
Supporters of the amendment spanned a broad ideological spectrum,
ranging from George Wallace to George McGovern, as well as the nation's
six previous presidents.2 An impressive array of national organizations,
including such unlikely bedfellows as the ACLU, the Teamsters Union,
the American Home Economics Association, and the Women's Christian
Temperance Union, were on record as favoring the ERA. According to
public opinion polls, a solid majority of Americans were equally
B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977 Yale Universitr, Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law
School
I am grateful to Paul Brest, Ann Freedman. Lawrence Friedman, Robert Gordon.
Thomas Grey, and Mark Kelman for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Catharine
MacKinnon. who convinced me to undertake this effort. Daniel E. Cohn and Karen E.
Wentzel provided valuable research assistance.
1. Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section 1,S.J. Res. 8, S.J.
Res. 9 and H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. 1st Seas. (1971). The remaining sections of the
amendment provided:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation.
the provisions of this article.
Section 3. The amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
The amendment was approved by a vote of 354 to 23 in the House of Representatives
and 84 to 8 in the Senate.
2. Other backers of the Amendment included Strom Thurmond and Spiro Agnew. See
Timmesch. The Sexual Equality Amendment, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1973 (Magazine), at
69. For a more complete catalogue of the politicians and associations supporting the ERA.
see J.Boles, The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision
Process, 196-202 app. D & E (1979);WohL, White Gloves and Combat Boots: The Fightfor
ERA, I Civ. Lib. Rev., Fall 1974, at 77, 78.
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supportive. 3 Unsurprisingly, within a few months after Congressional
approval, some twenty states had ratified the amendment. None experienced serious opposition, and women's groups were predicting
4
endorsement from the necessary thirty-eight by the following spring.
in Illinois, the momentum suddenly ceased. Phyllis Schlafly, a
conservative downstate resident with no national prominence, launched a
"Stop ERA" campaign that proved successful, first in Illinois, and then in
enough other states to block ratification. With perhaps pardonable
hyperbole, Schlafly characterized the achievement as the
most amazing David and Goliath victory of the 20th century . . . [a
triumph] over the combined oppositon of the White House, the

3. In June, 1982, just as the deadline for ratification expired, a Gallup poll revealed that
56% of those who had heard of the amendment supported it; 34% were opposed. Clymer,
7Time Runs Out for Proposed Rights Amendment, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1982, at 12, coL 3.
Those results were consistent with surveys taken frequently over the preceeding decade. In a
1975 Gallup Poll, 58% of respondents favored the amendment; 24% were opposed. See
Brozan, 58% in Gallup PollFavorEqualfRights.N.Y. Times, Apr. 10,1975, at45,coL 3. A
1976 poll showed 57% infavor and 24% opposed. The Gallup Polk Public Opinion 197277, at 447-684 (G. Gallup ed. 1978).
Such findings, however, require several caveats. First, it is by no means clear that those
responding had a clear appreciation of the content or plausible consequences of the
amendment. For example, in surveys of Utah and Oklahoma voters, when respondents read
the language of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment without it being labeled as such,
they approved the text by substantial margins. When asked whether they favored their
state's passage of the ERA, a large percentage of those who approved the language opposed
ratification. Voters Opposed to ERA But Support Its Concept Salt Lake Trib.. May 11,
1980, at Al; The ERA Loses Two More Rounds, Time, Feb. 1, 1982, at 18. Conversely,
some of those responding favorably to the amendment in opinion polls might have opposed
it had they been aware of its intended effect in areas such as military service. See note 106
infra. It also bears emphasis that these public opinion surveys afford no measure of
intensity of concern. A somewhat larger percentage of opponents than supporters may have
felt strongly about the issue. At least some observers in non-ratifying states perceived that to
be the case. See text accompanying notes 245-46 infra.
However, one critical point, which the opinion polls reflected, was that more women
than men opposed the amendment. See sources cited above and Gallup, Women in
America, 128 Gallup Opinion Index 18 (1976). As Part 11 indicates, virtually all of the
organized public opposition came from women. See text accompanying notes 36-44

infra.
4. Women ForeseeApprovalofSex-Amendment byMay, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,1972, at
27, col. 6. See also EqualRights Backers OrganizeNew DriveforAmendment, Chi. Trib.,
Aug. 26, 1973, at 21, coL I (quoting Peggy Lampl, Director of the League of Women Voters)
("Weall assumed it would whip through like the 18 year old vote.").
Such projections seemed consistent with events in the 20 states giving early
endorsement; debate was often perfunctory, in some instances occupying only minutes of
legislators' attention. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 143, 178 n.l. Indeed, in its haste to become
the second state to ratify, Nebraska neglected to pass Section 2 of the Amendment; Alaska
overlooked Sections 1 and 3. See C. Felsenthal, The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority 234

(1981).
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Congress, the Governors, television, radio, most newspapers, the
universities, the schools, the unions .. . [and] the 'good-sounding' semantics of equal rights.'
This study explores the foundations of that improbable achievement. In the process, it seeks to provide some insight into the dimensions
f symbolic politics in general and the significance of the equal rights
controversy in particular. On one level, the ratification campaign
presents an exceptionally rich and well-documented case history of the
levels and limitations of constitutional discourse in political arenas.
Drawing on a variety of primary and secondary sources,' the article
analyzes the complex linkages between legal argument and symbolic
subtexts in shaping public opinion, and the significance that such opinion
can assume in legislative decision making.
Moreover, the ERA debates are instructive for what they reveal not
only about symbolic politics, but also about the status of American
women. As subsequent discussion will suggest, ratification foundered on
a complex set of ideological and political difficulties. On a conceptual
level, the amendment faltered because of a deep-seated ambivalence
about the meaning of equality and the means of attaining it in a society
marked by vast disparities in the sexes' social roles and economic
circumstances. On a practical level, the ERA failed because its most
active proponents lacked sufficient adeptness, cohesion, and leverage to
counteract opposition strategies.
The following discussion chronicles both those failures. It focuses
closely, though not exclusively, on the Illinois campaigns; by Schlafly's
own account, anti-ERA victories there were the most "drama7
tic . . . sensational . . . [and] unexpected." They captured nation-

al attention, catalyzed opposition, and set the agenda for subsequent
debate.' In tracing the contours of that debate, the article identifies a
S. B. Friedan, The Second Stage 231-32 (1981) (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
6. In addition to books and articles concerning the Equal Rights Amendment, this study
relies on press coverage of the controversy, contemporaneous publications released by
interested individuals and organizations, correspondence to constituents by Illinois state
legislators, and personal interviews with a number of proponents, opponents, state
legislators and lobbyists. These interviews, as well as the collection of some primary source
materials, were completed in 1973 in conjunction with an unpublished undergraduate
thesis, D. Rhode, The Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment in Illinois: A Case Study in
Symbolic Politics (Jan. 1974). In a few instances, newspaper citations are incomplete due to
omissions in the clipping files and archives from which the articles were drawn. The
manuscript, notes, and primary source material are on file with the author.
7. Schipper, The Truth Will Out: An Interview with Phyllis Schlfly, Ms., Jan. 1982, at
89. See also Klemesrod, Opponent of ERA Confident of Its Defeat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
1975, at 44, col 1 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
8. See Klemesrod. supra note 7. at 44 (quoting Phyllis Schlaly) ("we'll stick with the
same strategy... when you've got a good thing going you stick with it.").
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poverty of both social theory and practical politics within the feminist
camp. Throughout the ratification struggle, ERA supporters proved
unable to develop a convincing affirmative case for constitutional change;
they never managed to cast the ERA as a step toward suppression of
gender hierarchies rather than gender differences. Nor did they adequately confront the immediate consequences of mandating legal equality
in a context of social and economic inequality.
Not only did proponents elide these core ideological issues, they
failed to develop effective prudential strategies. Many ERA supporters
became mired in legal technicalities or intemperate confrontations that
trivialized their arguments, and provoked rather than deflected opposition. Too much energy was expended on rallies for the converted, too little
on the more subtle arts of grass roots and parliamentary persuasion.
In addressing these conceptual and political failures, this article's
causal account is necessarily incomplete. It makes no pretense of
supplying a full explication of the economic, social, and psychological
determinants of the amendment's defeat. Nor does the analysis purport to
assess whether different strategies by ERA proponents might have altered
the result. The effort is rather to distill broader insights about the
dynamics of symbolic politics, some of which bear directly on choices
now confronting the women's movement.
Moreover, quite apart from its implications for future political
struggles, the ERA campaign merits analysis simply as an anthropological text. Few narratives offer so rich an account of this society's currently
competing visions of social norms and legal institutions. Underlying the
dispute over a single constitutional clause were a complex set of questions
about whose vision of women's role should prevail, and on what
terms.
I. An Overview of the Equal Rights Debate
A. The Rationalefor a ConstitutionalAmendment
The recent ratification defeat reflects only the latest skirmish in a
continuing struggle over the legal and social status of women. The first
proponents of an equal rights amendment were members of the National
Women's Party, the more militant wing of the suffragist movement. With
support from a steadily increasing constituency, resolutions proposing an
equal rights amendment surfaced in every Congressional term between
1923 and 1972.' The text of the proffered amendment varied, with most
9. For accounts of the amendment's evolution, see W. Chafe, The American Woman: Her
Changing Social, Economic, and Political Role, 1920-1970 (1972); and sources cited in
notes 10 and 15 infra. The political pressures culminating in the 1972 congressional
endorsement are reviewed in J. Pole, The Pursuit of Equality in American History 314-20
(1978).
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controversies centering on the implications for laws purportedly advantaging women.'" For example, in 1950 and 1953, the Senate passed
the amendment, but added a qualification (the Hayden rider) providing
that the measure "shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits or
exemptions now or hereafter conferred by law upon persons of the female
sex."" As the Senate Judiciary Committee later noted, this caveat killed
the amendment. Any such qualification was unacceptable to many
proponents, who believed "[i]t is under the guise of so called 'rights' or
'benefits' that women have been treated unequally and denied opportunities which are available to men."' 2 On similar reasoning, supporters
resisted efforts to attach clauses exempting women from military
service.'"
Almost a half-century after its initial proposal, an equal rights
amendment with no restrictive rider finally obtained congressional
approval. The 1972 endorsement was both explicable and somewhat
ironic in light of other governmental action. There was less necessity for a
constitutional provision and correspondingly less logic in opposing it,
given the proliferation of various state and federal statutes, executive
orders, and judicial decisions prohibiting many forms of sex-based
discrimination. '4
ERA proponents, however, generally have taken the view that these
actions by no means eliminate the need for constitutional recognition of
women's equal status. Their argument rests on two grounds. The
instrumental claim is that an amendment is the most effective way of
10. Some dispute also centered on the Amendment's enforcement provisions. An earlier
version of the text and the objections it triggered are recounted in Freund, The EqualRights
Amendment is Not The Way, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 234, 242 (1971).
11.96 Cong. Rec. 738, 872-73 (1950), 99 Cong. Rec. 8954-74 (1953).
12. S. Rep. No. 1558,88th Cong., 2d Seas. 2 (1964). For discussion of the role protective
legislation has played in constricting women's mobility in the work force, see Taub &
Schneider, Perspectiveson Women's Subordinationand the Role of Law, in The Politics of
Law-. A Progressive Critique 127-30 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); and A. Kessler-Harris, Out to
Work: A History of Wage Earning Women in the United States 180-214 (1982).
13. See discussion in note 104 infra. and B. Deckard, The Women's Movement: Political,
Socioeconomic, and Psychological Issues 391-94 (1975).
14. At the time of congressional endorsement, the most significant federal provisions
included the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex); The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)
(requiring equal pay for equal work); and Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 167 (1965)
(authorizing the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
inter alia, to deny, terminate or bar future government contracts with employers
discriminating on the basis of sex, and to require contractors and educational institutions to
develop affirmative action plans for the recruitment, employment and promotion ofwomen.
For discussion of state statutes providing analogous protection, see Greenman, Studies on
Family Law: Women's Rights and State Legislatures,Am. Fam. Inst. (1980), and sources
cited in notes 60 and 95 infra.
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obliterating the many sex-based classifications that persist under governmental auspices. Among the most frequently cited examples have
been employment practices that restrict women's occupational advancement; policies of publicly-subsidized educational institutions that foster
gender preferences or segregation; and welfare, credit, pension, domestic
relations, and military service provisions that reflect sexual stereotypes.
To seek legislative or judicial recourse against each discriminatory action
would, in proponents' view, result in interminable delay and inordinate
expense, and would afford no protection against future abuses. 6
Moreover, court decisions under existing statutory and constitutional
provisions have produced "uneven developments marked by sharply
divided opinions."" An equal rights amendment could nudge the
judiciary toward more searching scrutiny of sex-based classifications,
thereby providing the foundation and catalyst for a more egalitarian legal
order."8
15. The most comprehensive discussion of the ERA's rationale and likely consequences is
Brown, Emerson, Folk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale LJ. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Yale
Study]. See also Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 Harv.
C.R.-C.L L Rev. 216 (1971); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Guaranteeing Equal Rights for Women Under the Constitution (1981); and
sources cited in note 16 infra.
16. Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev.
225,229-30 (1971); see also Epstein, Consequences of the EqualRights Amendment for
the Professions,for the Roles of Professional Women andfor American Society, in The
Equal Rights Amendment Project of the California Commission on the Status of Women,
Impact ERA: Umitations and Possibilities 97, 99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as California
Commission].
17. Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,
1979 Wash. U.LQ. 161, 171. This result was partly attributable to the United States
Supreme Court's refusal to view sex as a "suspect" classification that would trigger strict
scrutiny. See id; Gunther, Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court" A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L Rev. 1 (1972); and note 18
infra.
For a general critique of Supreme Court decisions in this area, see Powers, Sex
Segregationandthe Ambivalent Directionsof Sex DiscriminationLaw, 1979 Wis. L Rev.
55; Johnston, Sex Discriminationand the Supreme Court, 23 UCLA L Rev. 235 (1975);
and Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 Harv. L Rev. 487 (1981).
18. In Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Supreme Court declined by a
five to four vote to hold classifications based on sex, like those predicated on race, alienage,
and national origin. as inherently suspect and therefore subject to the most rigorous judicial
scrutiny. Speaking for himself and two other members of the Court, Justice Powell
maintained that any such judicial categorization of gender distinctions would be premature,
given the pending Equal Rights Amendment, "which if adopted will resolve the substance of
this precise question." 411 U.S. at 692. The Court again declined to view sex as a suspect
classification in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 50 U.S.LW. 5068 (U.S. July 1,
1982).
It is plausible to suppose that a strong national endorsement of the ERA might have
inclined members of the bench toward a less tolerant perspective on sex-based classifi-
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In addition, many proponents view the amendment as a symbolic
affirmation of women's equal status. Although subsequent discussion
frequently will differentiate between instrumental and symbolic claims, it
bears emphasis at the outset that the terms are not mutually exclusive.
Many supporters who stress the ERA's symbolic salience do so in part
because they believe it would affect social expectations and institutions.
'Only a constitutional amendment, some proponents maintain, "with its
massive legal, moral, and symbolic impact, can provide the impetus for
the necessary changes in the law."' 9 Moreover, it is often assumed that a
constitutional legitimation of equal rights will affect private norms and
practices beyond the reach of legal regulation. Although the amendment
cannot of itself uproot such practices, it may prompt their re-examination.3 From that perspective, the ERA is "more than a mandate for
changing laws . . . [I]t is a symbol which, by dramatizing a need for
equality, legitimizes that need . . . unite[s] women, land] raise[s] their
consciousness."'" Thus conceived, the amendment promises to accelerate a role redefinition that will expand opportunities available to both
sexes.
Whether an Equal Rights Amendment is a necessary or effective
means of realizing those objectives remains open to considerable dispute,
as the analysis below reflects. Clearly, a significant constituency encompassing both constitutional scholars and committed feminists has always
viewed the amendment as merely "symbolic, and a terrible waste of
time."22 What has been less clear, and what many proponents have failed
cations. See Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L Rev.
'1, 54 (1977); Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendmen: is the Way, I Harv. Women's LJ.
19, 21 (1978). But see Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme
Court: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Ses. 15 (1975)
(statement of John Paul Stevens in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings) (suggesting
that the ERA's effect would be largely symbolic, given existing prohibitions against sex
discrimination under the fourteenth amendment). For a good overview of the empirical
research regarding linkages between public opinion and judicial decision making, see, e.g.,
S. Goldman & A. Sarat, American Court Systems: Readings In Judicial Process and
Behavior (1978).
19. Common Cause, Equality of Rights . . . Shall not be Abridged on Account of Sex:
Question and Answers 1 (1972).
20. For an account of the functions of law in "designating public norms," see Gusfield,
Moral Passage: The Symbolic Processin PublicDesignationsof Deviance, 15 Soc. Prob.
175, 177, 178 (1967). For an analysis of this function of the Equal Rights Amendment, see
Kirp, The Uneasy Casefor ERA, Christian ScL Monitor, Oct. 12, 1973, at El5, col 3; and
B. Brown, A. Freedman, H. Katz& A. Price, Women's Rights and the Law- The Impact of the
ERA on State Laws v-vi (1977) [hereinafter cited as B. Brown].
21. Introduction, California Commission, supra note 16, at 1, 4.Accord, Greenberg, The
ERA in Context. Its Impact on Society, in B. Brown, supra note 20, at 1, 11.
22. Only 24 Words in Equal Rights but Millions of Words About It, Chi. Trib., Apr. 1,
1973, at 33, col. I (quoting Philip Kurland). See also Kurland, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Some Problems of Construction. 6 Harv. C.R..C.L L Rev. 243 (1971);
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adequately to appreciate, is that substantial numbers of women question
the amendment's ends as well as means. Indeed, much of the ERA animus
stems less from the provision's alleged legal effects-which appear
technical and uncertain-than from its perceived symbolic impact. That
impact, as opposition leaders paint it, is to enshrine a "liberationist"
vision of an androgynous society. 3 Such a society, on the terms Schlafly
and her followers conceive it, would force women to renounce their
traditional roles, privileges, and priorities. A symbolic validation of that
world view threatens the status of those who have ordered their own lives
by different standards.
At its most fundamental level, the equal rights controversy was a
struggle over symbols. Those who dismissed the amendment as superfluous largely missed the point. Often when societal consensus is least
attainable, the public pressures to announce it through symbolic
governmental action are most intense. 24 As political theorist Murray
Edelman has noted,
Insofar as people's hopes and anxieties are salient to politics, they
turn on status in society and on security from perceived threat. For
the great mass of political spectators, cues as to their group status
and security . . . can come chiefly or only from government
acts. 2'

To both sides in the ratification struggle, the ERA was such a cue,
although there were pronounced internal divisions as to its precise
content. At the most abstract level, however, there was consensus. For
proponents, the ERA was a significant affirmation of equality as well as a
means for attaining it. For opponents, many of whom had been denied the
opportunities that the amendment sought to realize, it represented a
threat to current status and future security. That threat was one
proponents failed adequately to allay, first in Illinois, and then in the
national arena.
Freund, supra note 10. Over the last century, opponents have stressed similar themes. See,
e.g. W. Chafe, supra note 9, at 123 (quoting Mary Anderson, of the Women's Bureau, in
1942) ("It is not practical, It deals with abstract rights, not real rights"), (quoting Cornelia
Bryce Pinchot, in 1939) ("1 want equality yes . . . but I want equality that is a fact, not an
empty phrase."). So too, some contemporary feminists have expressed concern that the
amendment could become a vacuous palliative, a means of paying lip service to egalitarian
ideals while deflecting attention from more meaningful structural changes. See Z.
Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism 220-21 (1981).
23. See discussion in the text accompanying notes 119-66 infra.
24. Gusfield, supra note 20, at 188.
25. M. Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence 8-9 (1971).
See generally K. Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (1966); K. Burke, A Rhetoric of
Motives (1950).

19831

EQUAL RIGHTS IN RETROSPECT

B. The Chronology of Defeat
When two female legislators introduced the Equal Rights
Amendment in the Illinois House of Representatives in April, 1972,
every indication was that discussion would be perfunctory and ratification immediate. Serious opposition had not surfaced in any of the
twenty states that had already endorsed the federal texL There was no
reason to expect Illinois to be an exception. Just two years earlier, state
voters had adopted a new constitution with an equal rights provision
similar to the federal text.26 Moreover, ninety-three male representatives,
comprising a larger than necessary constituency for passage, offered to
co-sponsor the measure. Anticipating no difficulties, the two original
proponents declined assistance.
The reversal was sudden as well as unanticipated. Within a month,
Phyllis Schlafly had assembled a slate of arguments and a constituency of
vocal opponents that supporters could not begin to counter. The
amendment received seventy-five votes, fourteen short of passage and
eighteen less than the initial offers of sponsorship. 27 Astounded by the
result and incensed by the accompanying rhetoric (including one
legislator's reference to "bra-less, brainless broads"),28 supporters
hastily rallied. Local members of the National Organization for Women
(NOW) and the Federation of Business and Professional Women
coordinated lobbying efforts, arranged media coverage, distributed
literature, and solicited funds. In what struck some as one of history's
lesser ironies, the Playboy Foundation underwrote mailing and duplication expenses.
This counteroffensive won the next battle but quickly faltered. The
amendment cleared the Senate in May but fell seven votes short of
passage in the House that June. 9 Supporters viewed the setback
26. Section 18 of the Illinois Constitution Bill of Rights, ratified in December, 1970,
provides:
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex by the state or its units of local government and school districts.
Ill. Const. art. 1, § 18.
Phyllis Schlafly, however, has contended that this provision permits more sex-based
classifications than would the proposed federal amendment. That argument has not
received much attention from the scholarly community. For a general discussion of
Schlafly's claim, see Felsenthal, How Feminists Failed, Chicago, June 1982, at 143.
27. Illinois Rejects Women's Rights OK, Chi. Trib., May 17, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. S.
28. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 160 (quoting Thomas Hanahan) (Hanahan's reference was to
the protest staged before a Miss America pageant, at which feminists deposited offending
undergarments into a large garbage receptacle.).
29. Elmer, Women's Rights Bid Fails, Chi. Trib., June 16, 1972, at 1, col 8.
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as fundamentally irrational. As Gloria Steinem noted in a press
conference,
Strange, Illinois already has an equal rights clause. So these men
vote against the amendment. It's an odd attitude against the rest of
the country. Like, 'we're all right but the rest of you can be
damned.' 0
Subsequent events followed a similar pattern. In the decade
preceding the June 1982 deadline for ratification," the amendment failed
eight times in Illinois, almost always by closely divided votes." During
the time allotted, a total of thirty-five states ratified the amendment and
five rescinded their ratification, generally by narrow margins." Despite
increasingly sophisticated forms of proponent pressure, including wellfunded campaigns against particular legislators and a national boycott of
conventions held in recalcitrant states, the deadline expired without the
3 4
requisite thirty-eight state endorsements.
30. Gloria'sin Town Drumming ERA, Chi. Daily News, Mar. 23, 1973, at 19 (quoting
Gloria Steinem). Two other.non-ratifying states, Utah and Virginia, have equal rights
provisions in their constitutions.
31. In 1978, Congress extended the date for ratification to June 30, 1982. H.R.J. Res.
638,95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. H 8,26,264-65 (House), S34,314-15 (Senate)
(1978). A lowerfederal court judge held that extension invalid, but during the pendency of
the appeal, the 1982 limit expired without the requisite state endtrsements. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Idaho 1981); stayed, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982), dismissed as moot sub. nom. National Org.
for Women Inc. v. Idaho, 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
For discussion of the legal and policy issues implicated by the deadline extension, see
Ginsburg, Ratificationof the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Tne, 57 Tex. L
Rev. 919 (1979); and Rees, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionalityof the
Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 Tex L Rev. 875 (1980).
32. See B. Friedansupra note 5, at24; J. Boles, supra note2, at 149-61; Felsenthal, supra
note 26, at 139-42, 152-55.
33. The fifteen states that never ratified were Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Oklahoma, Missouri,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina,
North Carolina, and Virginia. The five states that attempted to rescind their ratifications
were Idaho, Nebraska, Tennessee, Kentucky, and South Dakota. A lowerfederal court judge
upheld the legality of those rescissions in a decision that the Supreme Court ultimately
declined to review on grounds of mootness. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 110 (D. Idaho
1981); stayed, 102 S. CL 1272, dismissedasmoot sub. nor. National Org. for Women Inc.
v. Idaho, 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
For discussion on some of the margins of defeat in non-ratifying states, see J. Boles,
supra note 2, at 141 n.37; and note 256 infra. In Illinois, the General Assembly losses
ranged from 2-12 votes, See ERAmerica, Status of ERA Ratification: 27th Amendment
(July 1980); Lentz, House Unit Rejects ERA Bid, ChL Trib., June 24, 1982, § 1, at 3,
col. 1.
34. NOW reportedly spent some $15 million in its 1981-1982 "Countdown Campaign."
Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 139. The legality of the boycott under federal antitrust laws was
upheld in State of Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980),
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Supporters have reintroduced the amendment in Congress, but
,vithlittle expectation of favorable action in the current political climate."
qonetheless, many proponents believe that to relinquish the struggle now
ould simply reinforce opponents' core assertion that America rejects
.qual rights as an appropriate societal aspiration. Yet other feminists,
many of whom actively campaigned for the ERA, question the wisdom of
its further pursuit. Why not invest limited political resources in seeking
tangible legislative changes, rather than a symbol that has become a
lightning rod for anti-feminist animus? No meaningful response to that
question is possible without some better understanding of the circumstances that prompted it. To that end, Parts II and III chronicle the rise of
ERA opposition, and the inadequacy of proponents' responses in both
public and legislative arenas.
11. The Public Response
A. The Participants
Disentangling the roots of public opposition to the Equal Rights
Amendment presents considerable difficulties, given the broad range of
interests at issue, and the inevitable divergence between participants'
actual and expressed concerns. Since the following analysis will focus
largely on the debate over sexual equality, it bears note at the outset that
there were additional dimensions to the struggle. For some pivotal figures
in the anti-ERA movement, the issue may have seemed a useful vehicle
for pursuing other objectives.
Certainly that claim is often made with respect to Phyllis Schlafly
and certain conservative organizations that promulgated her views. To
some extent, Schlafly's background invites such speculation, since her
personal life does not square easily with her professed ideology. A
graduate of law school and a Harvard masters program in political
science, Schlafly has written several books, edited a monthly newsletter
with a circulation of about 10,000 and run for various local and national
political offices." Yet throughout the ERA campaign, she emerged as the
cert. deniel 449 U.S. 842 (1980). Analysis of the boycott's political efficacy appears in
note 244 infra.
35. See note 260 infra. For discussion of supporters' gloomy prognoses, see MacNeilLehrer Report, WNET Thirteen, June 30, 1982, tr. at 4 (statement of Rep. Geraldine
Ferraro); Collin,As Symbollssue Will NeverDie, Chi. Trib., June 27,1982, § 2, at 1, col. 5
(remarks of House Sponsor D. Edwards [D.-Calif.]) ("In all candor there is not much
hope it would be passed this session.'. See alsoid., § 2, at 2, col. 6 (quoting Eleanor Smeal,
NOW president, predicting that struggle could take "ten, maybe 25 years").
36. See, e.g., Timmesch, supra note 2; Wohl, Phyllis Schlafly: The Sweetheart of the
Silent Majority, Ms., Mar. 1974, at 54, 55; Fraker, Women Versus Women, Newsweek,
July 25, 1977, at 34.
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paramount defender of woman's "God-given right to stay home.""
The anomaly has not escaped public notice. Gloria Steinem, in a
Chicago press conference, remarked with no small measure of aggravation that Schlafly
keeps saying that she's a housewife and mother. She's never home.
She has been all over the country talking against equal rights. It's
very elitist of her to act as though she's the only woman as
professionally capable as a man-and she IS a professional writer
and talker-while the other women need privileges.
Every woman should have the same choices as Schlafly, the
choice to have a child or not have a child, to stay home or hire
someone to take care of her child, the choice to have a husband
who'll support her.'
What further irritated ERA proponents was hearing a "woman of
Mrs. Schlafly's superior intelligence" make "simplistic misleading
statements about the ERA . . . when she fully underst[ands] the
complex realities . . . ."9 To many proponents, the incongruities
between Schlafly's life and rhetoric, coupled with her seeming disregard
for facts, suggested that she had political objectives unrelated to the
merits of ratification.4 The "Stop ERA" campaign unquestionably
37. Moore, Pros and Cons of ERA Battle, Chi. Daily News, Mar. 1, 1973, at 5 (quoting
Phyllis Schlafly).
38. Gloria'sin Town DrummingERA, supra note 30 (quoting Gloria Steinem). See also
Letter to the Editor of the Chicago Tribune Magazine from Fay Ruth (June 24, 1973)
("Mrs. Schlafly does not herself live . . .[a] sheltered life. Why does she wish it upon
other women?"); Wohl,supra note 36, at 54, 55 ("Schlafly's hardly one of the typical
'housewives' she claims to protect"); Egler, 3 Women Each With Right CausA ChL Trib.,
June 27, 1982, § 2, at 2, coL I (unidentified ERA supporter) (Schlafly is "a very liberated
woman . . . She's independent, intelligent, well-educated and articulate. I've always
found it very ironic that she is opposed to what she has gained.").
Of course, antifeminism among exceptionally successful women is by no means a rare
phenomenon. For an analysis of such attitudes among "honorary males," such as Phyllis
Schlafly, Florence Nightingale, Jane Addams, and Golda Meir, see C. Heilbrunn Reinventing Womanhood 42-44, 107, 111, 118-19 (1979). See also Klein, The Historical
Freeman ed. 2d ed. 1979)
Background, in Women: A Feminist Perspective 523, 539 (J.
(quoting Queen Victoria's appeal to all women of good will "to join in checking this mad,
").
wicked folly of Women's Rights with all its attendant horrors . .
39. Letter to the Editor of the New York Times Magazine from Catherine East (July 25,
1972).
40. For example, Catherine East, Executive Secretary of the Citizens Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, noted that "politically experienced" women who had known Schlafly
attributed her ERA activity to a desire for "political power." IU See also Shahanan, Rights
Plan CalledDevious, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1973, at 21, coL 1 (statement of Rep. Martha
Griffiths) (charging Schlafly with using the ERA "to build a right-wing political organization"); Herbers, Women Turn View to PublicOffice N.Y. Times, June 28,1982, at Al, col.
1, & B7, col. 4 (remarks of Oklahoma State Rep. Cleta Detherage) (asserting that conserva-
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conferred a good deal of public recognition and political leverage on
Schlafly. It also provided a catalyst in mobilizing women for other
conservative causes. So too, from the perspective of other organizations
that participated in the campaign, such as the John Birch Society, the
amendment may have assumed greatest importance as a means of forging
political coalitions that would remain active on a variety of other
issues.41
Although proponents frequently deplored the opposition's use of
the ERA for other purposes, feminists also found ratification to be an
effective organizational device. Over the past decade, membership in the
National Organization for Women grew from 6,000 to 210,000.42 The
visibility, strategies, and organizational structures that many women's
groups developed in the ERA campaign will prove valuable in other
contexts. As NOW president Eleanor Smeal asserted after the ratification
deadline expired, "Not a moment of it was wasted, even if we never
win."

43

Yet it seems improbable that most participants in the ERA
campaign saw the issue as a vehicle to promote other personal or political
tives, especially Schlafly, had "seized on the amendment and made it a political tool" for a
variety of right-wing causes).
41. SeA e.g., ERA Opposition is Attempt to Organize Womenfor ConservativePolitical
Purposes, Women Today, Apr. 30, 1973, at I (quoting Rep. Martha Griffiths to the effect
that no one in the opposition "cares whether the ERA isratified or not . . . IT]hey are
using women to organize them for another purpose'); id.(quoting Rep. Margaret Heckler's
description of the opposition as"misinformed people working with those who have political
ambitions"); Wohl, supra note 36. at 86 (remarks of Irwin Suall) ("There is no doubt that
the John Birch Society latched onto ERA . . . as an avenue to expand their influence");
Wohlsupra note 2, at 81 (remarks of Isabelle Shelton) ("In state after state, labor found that
the troops Mrs. Schlafly had organized for a blitz campaign against ERA would stay
behind . . . to use their new found legislative know-how to fight some of labor's pet
programs'); Fraker, supra note 36, at 34 (noting that coalitions initially formed to block the
ERA have now taken stands against abortion, day care, sex education, and related
issues).
42. Interview with Michael Lewis, Assistant to the Secretary, National Organization for
Women (Mar. 30, 1983) (citing figures for 1972 and 1982). Many of these members were
reportedly "recruited during the last ditch effort to save the ERA." Van Gelder, Electoral
Politics or Civil Disobedience?,Ms., Jan. 1983, at 38, 39. The organization has an annual
budget of 813 million and a network of 81 political action committees. 10L
The ratification campaign may also have helped galvanize support for feminist issues
among non-members. For example, a 1970 Gallup poll found women evenly divided on
whether they supported the movement to secure greater equality. By 1974, they endorsed
that movement by margins of two to one. W. Chafe, Women and Equality: Changing
Patterns in American Culture 139 & n.14 (1978).
43. B. Friedan, supra note 5, at 202 (quoting Eleanor Smeal). See also J.Freeman, The
Politics of Women's Liberation 222-23 (1975) (noting that, regardless of the outcome, the
campaign was valuable in enabling feminist organizations to establish liaisons with
politicians and the press, and in focusing national attention on women's issues). Accord, J.
Gelb & M. Palley, Women and Public Policies 20 (1982).
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ends. Almost all of the activists were women and relatively few seemed
animated by desires for public recognition. If they had been so inclined,
they might quickly have become discouraged by the frequently flippant
or patronizing tone of media coverage. For example, a 1972 Chicago
Daily News article offered the following account of one anti-ERA
organization's efforts:
PIN-UP GALS FIGHT LIB LAW
"Wear a safety pin with pride-it shows you are all woman."
That's the motto of the International Anti-Women's Liberation
League, which has come to Chicago to fight ratification by Illinois of
the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Mrs. Robert Pierce, Midwest director of the new group, invited
the Daily News to cover its organizational meetings.... However,
when very few women showed up for the two meetings, Mrs. Pierce
barred reporters.
"These are just organizational meetings and we don't want the
press to see how disorganized we are," said Mrs. Pierce.
[The group's literature] doesn't explain what wearing a safety
pin has to do with being an "all woman.""
On the whole, leaders of opposition groups were content to
maintain a low profile. As one anti-ERA organizer put it, we simply
wanted "to get the information out." 4 1 In Illinois, as in the nation
generally, most opponents left the public proselytizing to Schlafly and
made few visible bids for notoriety." Indeed, pro-ERA lobbyists were
often hard-pressed even to identify the opposition's activists. According
to one Illinois volunteer.
The lines of communication are really blurred. Women would show
up at the hearings with hand-made buttons and they also did an
effective phone campaign, but I have no idea how they were
mobilized."
44. Pin-up Gals Fght Lib Law, Chi. Daily News, Apr. 1972. See also text at notes 170-71
and 224-30 infra
45. Interview with Darlene Deginhardt, in Chicago (Aug. 5, 1973).
46. See J. Boles, supra note 2, at 86. Throughout the ratification struggle, Schlafly
remained the dominant opposition leader. She claimed 50,000 members in her Eagle Force
organization and was credited with establishing large networks of anti-ERA groups in every
state. See Fraker, supra note36, at34. Herrolein otherstates is chronicled inj. Boles, supra
note2, at 67, 86-87,115, 122,153-54; and Wohl,supra note 36, at 55. The most prominent
other opposition figure was Jackie Davison, founder of Happiness of Womanhood, a
California-based organization with an estimated membership of 10,000. Men orMice?Lib
Foes Raise Big Squawk, Chi. Daily News, Nov. 11-12, 1972, at 16; Happiness of
Womanhood, Inc., Meet Happiness of Womanhood Inc. I (undated, received 1973).
47. Interview with Barbara Clark, volunteer for ERA Central. in Chicago (July 18,
1973).
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Although proponent organizers were more visible, few appeared
intent on pursuing personal notoriety or political goals unrelated to
ratification. No previously unknown supporters gained substantial
national recognition in the ERA struggle, and many had no prior
commitment to women's issues. Indeed, for large numbers of women on
both sides of the campaign, the ERA was the first political issue with
which they had become actively involved. s What is most interesting and
ultimately most significant about the ratification debate is why these
women entered the fray, and what responses their involvement triggered
in public and legislative arenas.
B. The Arguments
The anti-suffragists published several
periodicals and organized many societies
but their activity was sporadic. It was
their ideology [which] was significant.
The antis defined the context within
which [pro-] suffragist ideas developed,
posed the problems the suffragists
had to solve, and asked the questions they
had to answer.'
A half century after the suffrage movement, the battle for women's
rights was still occuring in that framework. Unprepared for the sudden
"right-wing . . . blitz,"' 0 proponents quickly found themselves on the

defensive. It was a position from which they never fully emerged, in
Illinois or elsewhere." Rather than stressing the ERA's potential benefits
or underlying moral imperatives, proponents allowed Schlafly and her
disciples to define the ratification agenda.' 2.
48. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 85-86, 95. For a proflde of women who worked against the
Equal Rights Amendment in Texas, see Brady & Tedin, Ladies in Pink. Religion and
PoliticalIdeology in the Anti.ERA Movement, 56 Soc. Sci. Q. 564 (1975).
49. A. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement: 1890-1920, at 12

(1971).
50. Girdingforshe EqualRights War, Chi. Today, Mar. 8,1973, at 5 (quoting Ann Scott,
vice president for Legislation, NOW).
51. Midway through the 1973 campaign, a national Common Cause coordinator
acknowledged:
A lot of times we just found ourselves ina crisis situation. They caught us by
surprise. We spent our whole time responding to them and we almost got
away from fighting for the amendment.
Equal Rights Backers Organize New Drive, Aug. 26, 1973, at 21, col. 1 (quoting Ann
McBride, pro-amendment coordinator for Common Cause).
52. SeeJ. Boles.supranote2, at 186; O'Reilly, Big- Time PlayersBehind the Small-Town
Image, Ms., Jan. 1983, at 38, 59.
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The early Illinois campaign graphically illustrates the extent of
opponents' control. The most common format for pro-ERA literature was
a "Reality" sheet which restated key opposition arguments and juxtaposed proponents' rejoinders." Similarly, in public presentations,
supporters frequently framed their argument in purely responsive terms.
For example, one of the state legislators co-sponsoring the amendment
began a 1973 Chicago Tribune article with the following non-sequitur.
"What will the Equal Rights Amendment do? First it will not affect private
lives and social customs." 4 The remainder of the article proceeded in
similar fashion. Not one affirmative argument interrupted the rebuttal.
As the discussion below will suggest, the frequent absence of a
constructive position proved damaging throughout the ratification
campaign. Once Schlafly and her followers established the terms of
debate, proponents found themselves constantly arguing their weakest
points."' Moreover, the failure to convey a persuasive affirmative case for
constitutional change simply reinforced the opposition's primary
instrumental claim: that on balance, the amendment threatened more
than it promised.
1. The Instrumental Claims
Opponents' most firmly grounded, if not most salient, argument
concerned the legal necessity for a constitutional amendment. As noted
earlier, several distinguished constitutional scholars shared the opposition's view that the ERA would not significantly extend women's
protection against discrimination in employment, education, and credit
practices." They also agreed that abuses not already subject to federal
or state prohibition could be addressed by specific legislation.
53. A representative selection reads:
Myth. ERA will wipe out many protective labor laws which benefit
women.
Fact: Most so-called protective labor laws serve to keep women in lowerpaying jobs. Where these laws provide a benefit in health or safety they
can be extended equally to men.
ERA Central, What the Equal Rights Amendment Means I (undated, received June,
1973).
54. Dyer, Common Sense and Equal Rights, Chi. Trib., May 27, 1972, at12, col. 2.
55. As one New York supporter put it, "We found ourselves arguing about women being
drafted and losing custody of their children, instead of discussing discrimination in housing,
insurance and credit. . . .We cannot spend all our time telling opponents how wrong they
are." Fraker, supra note 36, at 35, 38 (quoting B. Fastesu. New York lawyer).
56. See, e.g., Kemesrod, supra note 7, at44,coL 2 (remarks of Phyllis Schlafly) ("It won't
give women any rights to employment or education or in credit because those rights are
already there, in the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, the education amendments of 1972
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.1).
For comparable views within the academic community, see sources cited in note 22
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In responding to this point, proponents typically underscored the
cost and delay of piecemeal challenges. According to an Illinois ERA
Central publication,
There are thousands of laws on the books of our fifty states which
discriminate against women. The opponents say to repeal them one
by one. This would take 100 years; and the decisions would have to
be made by a multiplicity of courts."'
Or, as one New York proponent later contended, it would be like trying to
enforce the Emancipation Proclamation "plantation by plantation.""
There were a number of difficulties with this argument. Most
obviously, as Schlafly and other opponents pointed out, not all problems
.ofimplementation would be removed by constitutional prescription;
"[e] ven if the Amendment were passed, [women] still would have to press
[their] grievance through the relevant [court or] agency."" 9
Moreover, as the struggle wore on, proponents' response became
less credible, given the increasing volume of specific legislative, administrative, and judicial actions striking down the most offensive forms
of sex discrimination." To be sure, as some supporters argued, these
actions were vulnerable to reversal absent constitutional underpinsupra. Critics have also submitted that it is easier to correct unintended adverse
consequences of a statutory mandate than a constitutional interpretation. See Note, Sex
Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment? 84
Harv. L Rev. 1499, 1520 (1971). In addition, some commentators have emphasized that
the amendment would not reach the private spheres in which invidious sex-based
prejudices are most firmly entrenched. See Kurland, supra note 22. Neither Schlafly nor
her followers stressed this point, perhaps because they entertained greater reservations
about the appropriateness or inevitability of such attitudes. See text accompanying notes
119-40 infra
57. ERA Central, supra note 53, at 1. See also K. DeCrow, Sexist Justice 301 (1975);
Ganucheau, Why I Support the ERA, 4 S.U.L Rev. 16, 20 (1977).
58. MacNeil-LehrerReport, supra note 35, st4 (Rep. Geraldine Ferraro quoting Barbara
Mikulski).
59. Cross, Dialog: Phyllis Schlafly, Chi Trib., Nov. 9, 1975, (Magazine), at 26, coL 2
(quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
60. See note 14 supra. According to one 1980 study of state gender discrimination laws in
areas such as employment, credit, housing, property and domestic relations:
States which have not ratified the ERA have been neither callous nor
insensitive to women's rights. Rather, they have chosen an alternative
approach to protect those rights, which has succeeded in combatting sex
discrimination without mandating an absolutist approach regarding sex
distinctions in areas relating to child welfare, marriage. [and] families ....
Greenman, supra note 14, at 14-15.
For a comprehensive account of the extent to which legislative, administrative and
judicial actions track the amendment's likely effect, see H. Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination,
133-62,314-19 (1981).
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nings.6 ' But such responses missed the real thrust of Schlafly's point.
Challenges to the amendment's necessity were not of themselves a potent
mobilizing force. Few voters are likely to rise in protest against constitutional redundancy. In essence, the opposition's strategy was useful
simply in undercutting assertions that the amendment was needed to
combat invidious discrimination, and in lending some academic luster to
the anti-ERA position. The core of Schlafly's instrumental challenge lay
in her claim that women would have to relinquish tangible benefits in
exchange for a vague promise of dubious value. Proponents' veiled
reference to "thousands" of objectionable laws of unspecified effect did
not meet that challenge. Nor did many of the vacuous and well-publicized
histrionics before state legislatures, such as Carol Burnett's plea on behalf
protected by the constitution,
of her three daughters: "Unless they're
62
what's going to happen to them?"
So too, analogies to the Emancipation Proclamation largely missed
the mark. The evils of slavery were self-evident. The need for an equal
rights amendment was not. Indeed, according to one public opinion
survey of the early 1970's, seventy-five percent of male respondents and
seventy-one percent of females considered the position of women in
American society to be either "excellent or good."61 Once Schlafly
planted doubts about the ERA's implications for laws favoring women,
proponents' failure to identify concrete countervailing benefits became
critical. The absence of a persuasive affirmative case reinforced the kind
of attitude expressed by one president of an Illinois women's Republican
club:
My feeling is that it would wipe out protections that women now
have . . . I think we are pretty well off the way we are."
The erosion of valuable benefits became one of Schlafly's most
effective themes. In virtually every public statement, Schlafly reiterated
61. See, e.g., Chafetz, The ERA and Redefinitionsof Work: Toward Utopia, in California
Commission, supra note 16, at 108, 111; American Bar Association, About the ERA 2
(Apr. 1980) (discussing the importance of a constitutional "bedrock" for statutory
protections). See also sources cited in notes 15 and 17 supra.
62. Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 142 (quoting Carol Burnett). Even otherwise dispassionate and carefully documented arguments were often punctuated by such assertions. See,
e.g., R. Eisler, The Equal Rights Handbook 3,5,221 (1978) (failure to affirm the ERA "can
only lead us into a nightmarish future," in which women's rights will "shrink and dwindle
until they no longer exist" and "we are [unable] to withstand the authoritarian menace from
within and without.").
63. Slowdown FearedforWomen's Rights, Chi. Today, Mar. 1, 1973. See also W. Chafe,
supra note 42, at 57 (arguing that the sense of solidarity among American women has
traditionally reflected a shared commitment to "nurturant" values rather than "a collective
awareness of injury and oppression").
64. ERA: Pros andCons, Wilmette Life, Mar. 22, 1973, at 3 1, col. I (quoting C. Patterson).
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and it
her claim that the ERA "won't do anything to help women, ...
will take away from women the rights they already have."'' Of the
examples she cited, the two that proved most powerful concerned
domestic support and military service exemptions."
According to Schlafly's August 1973 report, The PreciousRights
ERA Will Take Away From Wives,
The Equal Rights Amendment will enunciate a radical new principle
of equality in the matter of family support. This means that the
wife's obligation to support her husband will be equal to the
husband's obligation to support his wife. The obvious legal result is
that a wife will lose her right to be supported and will have a legal
obligation to go out to work to provide half the family income.6 7
Throughout the ratification campaign, Schlafly underscored her prognosis of the ERA's devastating effect on domestic financial arrangements.
The proposed twenty-seventh amendment, she informed a Chicago
Today reporter, would "deny women the right to be supported by their
husbands . . . [and] strike down good laws which guarantee that
women can be full-time wives and mothers."'" Her allegations in other
states were of a similar character, and were echoed repeatedly by other
m
"
opposition leaders.
These claims regarding support were among the most irritating to
proponents. According to one Chicago Tribune reader.
Mrs. Schlafly's statements are at best distortions, at worst
lies . . . [T] he idea that the ERA would force women to earn half

of the family income is particularly ridiculous. There is nothing in
the ERA that would force by law any personal financial arrangement 7

65. Klemesrod, supra note 7. at 44, col. 1 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
66. Other frequent illustrations included protective labor legislation, preferential child
custody statutes, single-sex educational programs, and gender-based insurance rates. See
sources cited in notes 53 & 56 supra, and 67 & 69 infra.
67. P. Schlafly, The Precious Rights ERA Will Take Away From Wives, 7 The Phyllis
Schlafly Report, Aug. 1973, § 2, at 1. See also Stop ERA, What the Equal Rights
Amendment Really Means (undated, received June, 1973); P. Schlafly, The Right to Be a
Woman, 6 The Phyllis Schlafly Report, Nov. 1972, at 1.
68. Girdingforthe EqualRights War, Chi. Today, Mar. 8,1973, at 22. See also Setback
for Women's Rights, Chi. Daily News, May 19, 1972, at 12; Senate Vote, Chi- Sun Times,
May 29, 1972; Schlafly, ERA: Equalfor Whom?, Chi. Trib., Mar. 18, 1973, § S. at 8,
coL 6.
69. For representative samples, see, e.g., Fraker, Women Versus Women, supra note 36,
at 34; Wohl, supra note 36, at 56; Timmesch, supra note 2. at 56. For an anti-ERA tract
mirroring Schlafly's reports, see G. Whittenberg, The E.R.A. and You (1975).
70. Letter to the Editor of Chicago Tribune Magazine from Rhonda Stein (Dec. 7,

1975).
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Congresswoman Martha Griffiths was of a similar view: either Schlafly
"doesn't understand how the ERA would work" regarding support
obligations "or she doesn't want to." 71 Other proponents were less
restrained. In a 1975 New York Times interview, Karen DeCrow, then
president of NOW, came straight to the point:
She's a liar. . . . The fact is that the right to support is extremely
limited. At least half the state laws in the United States do not say
that the husband must support the wife."
A growing number of jurisdictions, including Illinois, have
imposed support obligations in sex-blind terms."1 Even in those jurisdictions mandating the husband's support, courts have consistently declined to enforce such obligations in on-going marriages.74 As to postmarital support responsibilities, states have increasingly moved toward
gender-neutral statutes." Moreover, whatever the codified standards,
71. Battle is RagingAnew Over the Equal Rights Amendment Chi. Sun Times, Mar. 11,
1973 (quoting Martha Griffiths).
72. Klemesrod, supra note 7, at 44, col. 2 (quoting Karen DeCrow). See also Salmans &
Whitmore, Women versus Women, Newsweek, Nov. 3, 1975, at 25 (remarks of Bella
Abzug) (referring to opposition's "campaign of lies and distortions"); I. Eisler, supra note
62, at 5 (adverting to strategies based on "skillfully merchandized falsehoods, on half truths
and deliberate lies").
73. The Illinois domestic relations code provides that:
Every person who shall, without any lawful excuse, neglect or refuse to
provide for the support or maintenance of his spouse, said spouse being in
need of such support or maintenance, or any person who shall, without
lawful excuse, desert or neglect or refuse to provide for the support or
maintenance of his or her child or children under the age of 18 years, in need
of such support or maintenance, shall be deemed guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor . . .
Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, § 1101 (Smith-Hurd 1980). See also id, ch. 23, §§ 10-1. 10-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) ("A husband is liable for the support of his wife and a wife
for the support of her husband.") Both provisions were in force in 1972 when Schlafly made
her observations.
For references to other state provisions, see H. Kay, supra note 60, at 189-94, and
sources cited in note 76 infra.
74. Proponents frequently made that point. See Timmesch, supra note 2, at 68-69
(remarks of Rep. Martha Griffiths) ("There has never been a court in the United States that
would interfere in a marriage to require a husband to provide support."). Accord,
Ganucheau, supra note 57, at 32.
For representative examples of judicial reluctance, see, e.g., Brewer v. Brewer, 259
Ala. 149, 66 So. 2d 450 (1953); Smith v. Smith, 86 Ohio App. 479,92 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1949). See also Yale Study, supra note 15, at 945 ("Many courts flatly refuse to
enter a support decree when the husband and wife are living together. In most such cases the
husband, as head of the family, is free to determine how much or how little of his property his
wife and children will receive.").
75. The proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which many states have adopted in
substantial part, requires issues of post-marital support to be determined on a sex-neutral
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only a very small percentage of divorced women in fact obtain any spousal
support awards, and fewer still are able to collect anything close to
6
adequate payments following termination of their marriages.
Such factual qualifications, however, rarely penetrated the ratification debate. They were almost never discussed by opposition leaders,
some of whom took considerable liberties with legal authority. Most
notably, Schlafly's references to cases, treatises, and law review articles
were often misleading or erroneous, and public corrections had little
discernible effect on her statements." Worse still, from proponents'
perspective, such corrections often had no greater effect on her
audience.
Despite repeated rebuttals in pro-ERA publications, speeches, and
press statements, misperceptions about support responsibilities persisted. Schlafly's predictions remained the received wisdom in many
communities, particularly. those with large numbers of non-working
wives. 5 Illinois legislators continued to receive letters from middle-aged
basis, depending on the needs and abilities of the parties. See Kanowitz,The ERA: The Task
Ahead, 6 Hastings Const. LQ. 637, 648 & n.48 (1979).
76. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property,Alimonyand ChildSupportAwards 28 UCLA L Rev. 1181,1221,1225,1254
55 (1981) (finding, inter alia, that in Los Angeles and San Francisco counties of California
oidy 17% of divorced women were awarded spousal support in 1977; that the average
amount is "too meagre to be considered a bons fide means of support;" and that within six
months of a divorce, one in six men was already in arrears in payment). For comparable
findings, see Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Child Support and Alimony.
1978, at 1, 12 (1981); Seal, A Decade of No Fault Divorce, 1 Fain. L Advoc. 10, 11-14
(1979); and N.Gordon, C.Jones & 1.Sawhill, Child Support Payments in the United States
25-26 (Urban Institute Working Paper 992-1003, Oct. 1, 1976). The difficulties in
enforcing male support obligations are comprehensively reviewed in D.Chambers, Making
Fathers Pay (1979).
77. For example, the authors of the Yale Study have testified to constant misuses of their
work. According to one coauthor, Thomas Emerson:
What they have done is to take quotes out of context, cut off sentences, leave
out parts of paragraphs, twist it around, and essentially make whole sections
mean what they don't mean at all.
Wohlisupra note 36, at85 (quoting Thomas Emerson). Another of the Yale coauthors, Gary
Falk, recalls publicly correcting Schlafly's misinterpretation of the article in her testimony
before the Tennessee legislature and then hearing her "repeat the same inaccuracies" in
West Virginia testimony a month later. Id.at 86. Schlafly also circulated statements by
Senator Ervin which seriously misconstrued the Yale Study. See Citizens Advisory Council
on the Status of Women, ERA: Senator Ervin's Minority Report and the Yale Law Journal 1
(1972).
For discussion of Schlafly's misrepresentation of a judicial decision regarding support
obligations, see icat 56 (remarks of Judith Areen, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown
University).
78. For example, the president of a women's Republican Club in one of Chicago's most
affluent North Shore suburbs reported that most members were opposed to the ERA
because they believed it would jeopardize "property rights, and your rights as a wife." ERA:
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housewives, acknowledging that the amendment was "all right for a
younger woman," but adding that they had never had a job and were
'9
unsure how to support themselves if the ERA passed. Other correspondents with "rocky marriages" were concerned about the amendment's effects on alimony and child support.o And in many other
states, the ERA's perceived threat to financial security proved equally
difficult to allay."
Yet at least some of these difficulties were of proponents' own
making. A few feminists complicated life for their more diplomatic
colleagues by conceding and even embracing Schlafly's dire assessments.
Thus, for example, ERA proponent Dr. Joyce Brothers assured Schlafly
in a televised debate that "[t] he idea that a woman can sit home and be
2
supported by her husband has long ago died out."" "Forty million
women are being supported by their husbands today" was Schlafly's
rejoinder.' 3 Whether or not the figure was accurate is largely beside the
point. Substantial numbers of television viewers undoubtedly were in the
position Schlafly described, and did not appreciate hearing that they were
an endangered species.
Many other proponents were equally ineffectual advocates,
although for different reasons. When responding to opposition arguments
regarding a wide range of protective legislation, including support
statutes, pro-ERA leaders frequently became mired in details that their
audience was neither inclined nor equipped to absorb. Much proponent
literature included long exegeses on state domestic relations, insurance,
credit, or labor laws, complete with full bibliographic references and
turgid quotations." So too, in press interviews, those responding to
Pros and Cons. supra note 64 (quoting E. Neely).
79. Interview with Sen. Eugenia Chapman, in Chicago (Aug. 13, 1973) (quoting

constituent letters); interview with Sen. Esther Saperstein, in Chicago (July 25, 1973)
(recounting similar correspondence).
80. Interview with Sen. Eugenia Chapman, supra note 79.
81. See J.Boles, supra note 2, at 4, 103. See also Van Gelder, The 400,000 Vote
Misunderstanding, Ms., Mar. 1976, at 67; G. Whittenberg, supranote 69, at 23-24; Beck,
Howard & Maier, Last Hurrahfor the ERA?, Newsweek, July 13,1981, at 24.
82. Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 140 (quoting Joyce Brothers).
at 140 (remarks of Vivian
For other feminist statements of the same genre, see, eg., id.
Gornick visiting professor, University of Illinois, at Champaign-Urbana) ("Being a
housewife is an illegitimate profession."); id. at 139 (remarks of Kate Millet) ("The care of
children is infinitely better left to the best trained practitioners . . . . The family, as the
term is presently understood, must go.").
83. Id. at 140 (remarks of Phyllis Schlafly).
84. The following example is not atypical:
THE TRUTH IS-This alleged -law of domestic relations" [cited by the

opposition] is not enforced by the courts for a marriage that is still intact. In a
over the United States, courts have
series of cases from jurisdictions all
consistently refused to interfere with the ongoing marriage relationship by
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Schlafly's crisp and comprehensible assertions often supplied overly

detailed descriptions of prevailing statutory obligations and the full
context from which Schlafly had drawn misleading excerpts."5
That such extended rejoinders failed to dislodge opposition claims

is scarcely surprising. As political analysts have noted, one of the
distinguishing and effective features of extremist rhetoric is its simple,
unambiguous ascription of causes and consequences. 6 Many proponents felt they could not creditably capture the amendment's likely
instrumental results in such uncomplicated terms. As a result, they often
found themselves enmeshed in tedious explanations.87 Such accounts
were poorly calculated to reach women swayed by opposition rhetoric,
most of whom neither desired nor attempted to explore the legal
intricacies underlying either side's claims.
So too, proponents' repeated invectives against opposition leaders
were ill-suited for the constituency most in need of persuasion. In one of
the more celebrated but by no means unique instances, Betty Friedan
informed Schlafly that "I'd like to burn you at the stake."" In a similar
vein, Presidential adviser Midge Costanza suggested that Phyllis Schlafly
adjudicating whether a husband was supporting his wife in a suitable
fashion. (Brewer v. Brewer, 259 Ala 149, McGuire v. McGuire 157
Nebraska 226, Smith v. Smith, 86 Ohio App. 479.) Every court has held that
in order to enforce her support rights, a wife must be separated from her
husband.
Illinois law, however, does hold a wife and her husband equally responsible
for debts to creditors. Within the ongoing marriage "the expenses of the
family and of the education of the children shall be chargeable upon the
property of both husband and wife, or either of them in favor of creditors,
therefore, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately." IlL
Rev. Stat. Ch. 68 Section 15.
The child support law which originally placed responsibility for a family
only on fatherswas specifically changed 44 years ago to make the expenses of
the family chargeable to both parties. Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 334 IlL 386 (1929).
ERA Central, What is the Stop ERA Movement and Why Are They Saying All Those
Terrible Things About Us (undated, received June, 1973).
For comparable examples regarding other forms of protective legislation, see id, and
publications cited in notes 53 supra, and 102 infra.
85. See, eg. Wohl, supra note 36, at 56 (quoting proponent's description of a judicial
opinion that Schlafly had mischaracterized). The press was not always interested in the
details. See, e.g., Timmesch, supra note 2. at 69 (acknowledging but not detailing one
supporter's ability to discuss various state and federal statutes regarding prison sentences,
pension benefits, welfare payments and educational practices).
86. See S. Upset & C.Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America,
1790-1970, at 3 (1970).
87. Wohl, supra note 2, at 81. See also note 84 supra.
88. Felsenthal supra note 26. at 156 (quoting Betty Friedan).
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and Anita Bryant would make "a fine set of bookends for Hitler's Mein
Kampf."' 9 Profiting perhaps from such examples, one Chicago supporter
counseled that the "only way to debate Mrs. Schlafly is to jump up and
down and shout 'Liar Liar Liar.' "9
It is difficult to conceive of poorer advice. To the average member of
her audience, Schlafly did not seem disingenuous. Insofar as the debate
turned on issues of credibility, proponents were at a decided disadvantage. As public opinion surveys at the time suggested, the feminist
movement did not project a favorable image to most American women. 91
By contrast, Phyllis Schlafly, with her polished presentations, conventional appearance, and apparent legal expertise, made an excellent
impression on middle-class audiences. 9' Challenges to Schlafly's sincerity, particularly those framed in strident tones, were as likely to' alienate
as to persuade the uncommitted.
Moreover, the harangues against opposition misstatements were
counterproductive in a still more fundamental respect. The preoccupation with Schlafly's inaccuracies deflected attention from the
substantive issues and underlying sources of public opposition. As Betty
Friedan noted midway through the campaign, "[w] hile lies were spread
by ERA opponents, they fed real fears of women." 93 Too often proponents
focused on the lies rather than the fears.
Those fears warranted serious attention on several levels. As to the
support issue in particular, housewives' concerns were by no means as
groundless as many proponents supposed. Although pro-ERA activists
89. Id (quoting Midge Costanza).
90. Fraker, supra note 36, at 35 (quoting Diane Smith, Director of Chicago Central Loop
YWCA).
91. See Van Gelder, supra -note 81, at 67 (citing national survey findings that 65% of
American women support "most of the efforts to strengthen and change women's status in
society," but only 17% have a positive image of the women's movement and its major
organizations). Cf. L Harris & Assoc., The 1972 Virginia Slims American Women's
Opinion Poll 4, 11 (1972) (reporting that 39% of women described themselves as
sympathetic, and 49% as unsympathetic to the women's movement; men were evenly
divided, with 42% on each side).
92. See, e.g., Wohl, supra note 36; Letter to the Editor of the Chicago Tribune Magazine
from Mary Hollis (June 24, 1973):
I was pleased to see the article on Phyllis Schlafly. She is doing a magnificent
job for the hundreds ofwomen who disagree with the Ub MovementI We are
busy with our homes and families but she has taken her time and efforts and
given us a voice.
Moreover, Schlafly was often able to cite her adversaries' ad feminem approach as
evidence of their vulnerability on the merits. See C. Felsenthal, supra note 4, at 301
(quoting Phyllis Schlafly's frequent rejoinder. "If my opponent had any substantive case for
ERA, she wouldn't have to spend so much of her time attacking me.").
93. Nemy, Feminists Reappraise Directionand Image, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1975, at 1.
col 6 (quoting Betty Friedan).
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generally assumed that gender-neutral statutes would be written and
enforced to protect the interests of the non-working spouse," experience
with such legislation has not entirely confirmed those assumptions. For
example, although they have avoided the stereotyping embedded in their
antecedents, most sex-blind codes have not addressed the structural
inequities and enforcement problems of greatest concern to divorced
9
women. s
On a more general level, proponents also failed adequately to
confront the consequences of legal equality in a context of social
inequality. For many older women, who had followed traditional role
patterns and now lacked marketable skills or independent incomes, the
prospect of gender-neutral property dispositions seemed more a threat
than a benefit. From their perspective, the amendment offered an
unpalatable and unnecessary exchange. Proponents never convincingly
explained that sex-blind statutes need not overlook domestic contributions. The perception lingered that full-time homemakers would have
opportunities that they
to pay the price of expanding some abstract set of
96
had never experienced and would never enjoy.
94. For proponents' assumptions regarding the fairness of sex-blind support provisions,
see, e.g., Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women. The Equal Rights
Amendment and Alimony and Child Support Laws 10-11 (1972); ERA Central publications cited in notes 53, 84 supraand note 102 infra;Weitzman, LegalEqualityin Marriag"
The ERA's Mandate, in California Commission, supra note 16, at 184; U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights, supra note 15, at 12.
95. Thus, Stanford sociologist Lenore Weitzman found that California's formal "equal
division" rule for the property of divorcing couples in fact disadvantaged women because:
so many assets (particularly benefits resulting from job training, seniority, etc.) were not
subject to division; child or spousal support awards were initially inadequate and quickly
eroded by inflation; and noncompliance with court awards was pervasive. See Weitzman,
supra note 76, at 1264-65. California's experience appears representative. See B. Brown,
supra note 20, at 137-45. See also note 77 supra.

For other assessments of sex-blind statutes and state constitutional provisions on
domestic relations laws, see Kurtz, The States' Equal Rights Amendments and Their
Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 Faro. LQ. 101 (1977); Comment, Equal Rights
Provisions:The Experience UnderState Constitutions,65 Calif. L Rev. 1086 (1977). But

see U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Statement on the Equal Rights Amendment4 (1978) (on
the basis of a study of the 16 states with constitutional amendments "virtually identical to
the proposed Federal amendment it is . . . clear . . . that the ERA is the appropriate

remedial action to . . . assure men and women equal justice before the law.").
Compare also the relatively positive assessment of Maryland statutes and Pennsylvania constitutional provisions in U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 15, at 12-13;
and Legislation, The Maryland Equal RightsAmendment: Eight Years of Application, 9

Balt L Rev. 342, 353-63 (1980); with the more sobering evaluations of New York.
California, Hawaii, and Indiana laws, e.g., B.Friedan, supra note 5, at 19; Weitzman, supra
note 76; B. Brown, supra note 20, at 141-42.
96. Thus Philip Kurland argued:
There is no doubt that society permitted these women to come to maturity not
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Similarly, some younger working women raised related questions
about the value of equal rights under circumstances of unequal opportunities. As long as women faced substantial economic discrimination,
the loss of any concrete benefits seemed a high price to pay for symbolic
parity. As Simone de Beauvoir had noted decades earlier, it is "quite
understandable" that the female worker receiving minimal wages, the
"shopgirl, the secretary, will not care to renounce the advantages of
masculine support." 9 Ironically, proponents' arguments about sex bias
in employment options and wage scales may simply have exacerbated
some women's fears. As one New York opponent submitted,
[i] fa man and a woman, equally qualified, go to an office to apply for
the same job, who's going to get it? The man .... Even if a law is
passed against that, you can't change the way society is thinking.
That takes education. Meanwhile why take the risk of having women
lose their alimony?"

Although legal developments during the 1970's accomplished many of
the ERA's intended objectives regarding alimony, support, and protective labor statutes," the public's perception of unwelcome tradeoffs
lingered on.
For many women, draft exemptions appeared to be yet another
illustration of the benefits they would relinquish under the Equal Rights
Amendment. Front-line combat duty was not a congenial prospect, and
that spectre was one on which opponents effectively capitalized. In 1973,
as competitors with males but rather as the bearers and raisers of their
children and the keepers of their homes. A multitude of women still find

fulfillment in this role. This may be unfortunate in the eyes of some, but it
remains a fact. It can boast no label of equality now to treat the older
generations as if they were their own children or grandchildren. Nor can
women be regarded as unified in their desire for this change. Certainly the
desire to open opportunities to some of them can be achieved without the
price of removing the protection of others.
Kurland, supra note 22, at 248.
97. S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 642 (H.M. Parshley trans. 1952). The point still has
force. Two-thirds of all American female workers are employed in clerical, service, or sales
jobs. L Howe, Pink Collar Workers: Inside the World of Women's Work 17-22 (1977).
98. Van Gelder, supra note 81, at 68 (remarks of Barbara Goldstein, claims checker and
night college student).
99. See, eg., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding unconstitutional Alabama statute
that authorized alimony awards payable by husbands but not wives); George v. George, 487
Pa. 133,407 A.2d 1(1979); Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d298, 582 P.2d 467 (1978);
Kanowitz, The ERA- The Task Ahead, 6 Hastings Const. LQ. 637,64749 (1979); Kurtz,
supra note 95, at 109-15. Thus, as Norman Dorsen observed in a statement prepared for the
Senate Judiciary Committee, opponents often seemed to be "trying to erect bridges which
117 Cong. Rec. 933 (Jan. 28,1971). See also notes 14,60,
were [already] crossed .
& 95 supra.
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Schlafly led a well-publicized march on the Illinois state capitol featuring
baby girls with signs pleading "Don't draft me."' 00 The campaign had its
desired effect. In Illinois as elsewhere, the most commonly voiced
objection to the ERA concerned the draft'
Proponents' usual rejoinder, that Congress already had power to
draft women,'02 was hardly adequate to the occasion. According to
Schlafly, the ERA would require women to assume the same military
obligations as men, including combat service. The legal predicate for that
assertion was not impregnable, as a recent Supreme Court decision
suggests. 03 Nonetheless, a substantial number of scholars and supporters agreed that the amendment would mandate sex-neutral treatment
by all armed forces. But unlike Schlafly, these proponents did not recoil at
the thought of women in combat. Thus, the authors of a highly influential
JERA analysis concluded:

Iwjomen are physically as able as men to perform many jobs
classified as combat duty. .

.

. There will be many women able to

pass [a sex-neutral combat screening] test . . .
IN]o one would suggest that combat service is pleasant or that
the women who serve can avoid the possibility of physical harm and

100. J.Boles, supra note 2, at 126. See also text accompanying note 180.
101. J..Boles, supra note 2, at 170. See also H. Kay, supra note 60, at 144.
102. See, e.g., ERA Central, Should Women Have the Same Rights as Men? The U.S.
Congress Says Yes, Don't Let Illinois Say No. (Mar. 28, 1973) (paid advertisement in
Chicago Sun.Times). See also ERA Central publications cited in notes 53 and 84
supra.

Proponents' other major argument, that only a tiny percentage of military inductees
ever saw combat service, was equally vulnerable. As Schlafly frequently responded, "This
is like saying that only 55,000 American servicemen were killed in Vietnam." Felsenthal,
supra note 26, at 157 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
103. In Rostker v. Goldberg. 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the 1980 draft
registration law exempting women. Under the majority's analysis, Congress was free to
conclude that inducting females would prove unduly burdensome. Given that women are
not now eligible for combat, their inclusion in a draft could result in substantial expense
(such as the cost of training and separate facilities), and loss of flexibility (resulting from the
inability to rotate women to front line service). Presumably, comparable administrative
convenience arguments could be invoked to sustain sex-based combat exemptions under an
equal rights amendment. See Letter from the Defense Department to Senator Birch Bayh,
Feb. 24, 1972,118 Cong. Rec. 9088 (daily ed. Mar. 20,1972). Even unders strict scrutiny
approach, it might have been possible for some justices to view national security as a
sufficiently compelling interest to justify excluding women from front-line service.
The difficulty with that argument, however, is that the legislative history of the 1972
ERA does not indicate that Congress felt such a categorical exception was warranted.
Rather, the full House and Senate specifically declined several opportunities to modify the
amendment to exempt women from the draft. See Yale Study, supra note 15, at 969 n.255
(noting that in 1970 the Senate endorsed such an exemption, and that in 1971, the House
Judiciary Committee reported out the ERA with a similar qualification).
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assault. But . . . [a]s between brutalizing our young men and

brutalizing our young women there is little to choose.'"
It is by no means clear that most Americans share that view. In
Schlafly's opinion, proponents' support of women in combat "put the
nails in ERA's coffin."'Os National survey findings are certainly consistent with that assessment. Public opinion polls consistently revealed
that a majority of Americans favored the Equal Rights Amendment, but
opposed equal treatment for the sexes in military service.10
Although some of this opposition doubtless stemmed from the
attitudes noted above-a reluctance to exchange tangible benefits for
more conjectural promises-the roots of public resistance went deeper.
According to Schlafly, Americans did not want their daughters "treated
104. Yale Study, supra note 15, at 977. That study was reprinted in the Congressional
Record. 117 Con& Rec. 35012 (daily ed. OcL 5, 1971). For comparable views, see Wohl,
supra note 36, at 57; Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to Criticsof the
Equal RightsAmendment, 23 Hastings LJ. 199 (1971); and Kanowitz, The ERA: the Task

Ahead, 6 Hastings Const. LJ. 637, 647 (1979) ("in my opinion . .. having our youth
torn apart by enemy shrapnel is equally horrendous whether the victims are male or
female.").
Other proponents were less equivocal in their endorsement of women's participation in
the military. See J. Freeman, supra note 43, at 215 (testimony before House Judiciary
Subcommittee. April 5, 1971, by representatives from "Women's liberation" of George
Washington University) ("Sex exemption from the draft is a negation of our ability to face
the most onerous self-determination question of our times."). NOW president Eleanor
Smeal, in objecting to women's exemption from draft registration, took a similar stance, the
exclusion treated women as "second-class citizens" and denied them a"politically maturing

experience." Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 157 (quoting Eleanor Smeal). Although in
context, Smears comment apparently referred to the experience of resisting induction

rather than service on the front lines, the distinction escaped most journalists and ERA
opponents. See id. See also Ginsburg. Gender and the Constitution,44 U. Cin. L Rev. 1,

24-25 (1975) (noting that combat exclusions have impeded women's advancement in the
armed forces); M. Binkin & S. Bach, Women and the Military 98-99 (1977) (Brookings
Institute study providing comprehensive analysis of military positions in which women
could perform at least as effectively as men); Note, The EqualRights Amendment and the

Military, 82 Yale LJ. 1533. 1539-54 (1973).
105. Felsentha supra note 26, at 157 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly). Other observers agreed
that the draft has remained a "focal point of opposition to the Amendment" H. Kay, supra
note 60, at 19. See also note 101 and accompanying text.
106. For a summary of the major polls on support for the amendment, see note 3, supra. A
1980 Gallup poll disclosed that 5 1%of those surveyed favored women's induction in future
drafts, but only 41% wanted them to be eligible for combat roles. Gallup, Public Support
.
GrowsforReviving the Draft, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 3,1980, at 12, col 1Thirty-nine

percent of male respondents and 50%of females opposed drafting women, and 53% of
males and 56% of females surveyed opposed women's participation in combat. A Roper
poll, which Senator Ervin entered into the Congressional Record, found that 64% of male
respondents and 77% of females objected to women's "equal treatment regarding the draft."

See 118 Cong. Rec. 3072-73 (1972).
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like men or . . . sex playmates in the armed forces."' 0' And to a
substantial constituency, drafting women raised both such concerns.
Despite their often dubious factual foundations, concerns regarding sexual privacy and promiscuity in the armed forces proved
difficult to dispel. Occasionally, military spokesmen were summoned to
deny Schlafly's specific allegations, such as those regarding servicewomen's provocative clothing or licentious conduct.1'SMost often,
however, proponents simply dismissed opposition claims as incredible
on their face. That strategy may well have been imprudent, given the
persistence of such concerns, even among relatively sophisticated
audiences. Thus, opponents predicted in legislative floor debates that
women would be housed in "barracks full of hardened military men,"'9
and traumatized by open latrines and soldiers relieving themselves in
public. "0
Similarly, proponents' tendency to ridicule rather than refute other
assertions regarding sexual privacy was of dubious strategic value. The
most notorious example involved Schlafly's account of the ERA's effects
on public bathrooms. By her reasoning:
It is clear that the only reason that this nation has separate restrooms
for men and women and boys and girls is sex. Consequently, being a
distinction based on sex, the ERA would abolish the power of the
Federal Government and the power of the 50 states to require
separate facilities of this nature for persons of different sexes."'
With comparable logic, other opposition spokesmen projected the demise
of sex-segregated locker rooms, saunas, and hospital facilities." 2 Indeed,
as one Illinois opponent grimly warned, "The House of the Good Shepherd
for wayward girls, I suppose, can be inhabited by anybody looking for a
room for the night.""'
107. ERA Marches On To Another Loss Time, May 26, 1980, at 23 (quoting Phyllis

Schiafy).
108. See, e.g., Wohl,supra note 36, at 57, 85 (response of S. Duncan, Navy Public Affairs
officer, to Schlafly's account of life aboard the U.S.S. Sanctuary; Duncan also denied
allegations that women had engaged in tantrums to evade work).
109. Florida Senate Rejects Equality For Women: ERA Proponents Will Ask the Voters,

Women Today, Apr. 29, 1974, at 53.
110. See Women's Rights: Some Like it Not, Newsweek, Jan. 15, 1973, at 17 (describing
arguments by Illinois state legislators); Royko, Borchers Hip to Girl Power, Chi. Daily
News, Mar. 26, 1973, at 3, col 1. (quoting Illinois State Representative Webber
Borchers).
111. See Stop ERA, supra note 67, at 1.
112. G.Whittenberg, supra note 69, at 41-42.
113. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting unidentified Illinois source); The ERA Loses Two
More Rounds, supra note 3, at 18.
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Despite the obvious difficulties with such syllogisms, proponents
frequently focused on the arguments' triviality rather than their merits. A
favorite technique was to dismiss these claims as pretextual-the "potty
excuse."" 4 Some proponents could not resist the observation that
Schlafly herself apparently had managed to survive the ordeal of
undifferentiated restrooms during her frequent airline excursions to
testify against the amendment. So too, pro-ERA literature often declined
to dignify the issue by providing a substantive rebuttal. '
The effectiveness of such rejoinders, or of the sexual and privacy
objections themselves, is impossible to gauge. But the persistence of these
issues suggests that they touched deeper nerves than proponents
acknowledged. Although the particular examples opponents cited may
not have had great independent significance, they cumulatively evoked a
vision of androgyny that threatened many core values and perceptions.
Under opponents' analysis, these examples, and by extension the ERA,
symbolically affirmed an asexual social order that ran counter to widely
accepted norms.
2. The Symbolic Underpinnings
Early in the ratification struggle, opposition leaders began char114. The term was reportedly coined by Senator Cook and his staff. 188 Con& Rec. 9531
(1972). Senator Mikva offered a comparable characterization: the "toilet training trauma"
(quoted in B. Deckard, supra note 13, at 173).
115. Thus, for example, Washington Governor Daniel Evans submitted: "[Tihe accusations concerning integration of facilities are so ridiculous, we in Washington have ceased to
reply to them." Letter from Daniel J.Evans (Feb. 5,1976), quotedin Report of the National
Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year, To Form A More Perfect
Union: Justice for American Women 28 (1976).
Similarly, one representative Illinois publication dismissed the argument with the
observation:
STOP ERA asserts that equality means integrated bathrooms and dressing
rooms. THE TRUTH IS-Aside from the obvious frivolity of this topic, the
constitutional right to personal privacy, re-asserted in the strongest language
by the Supreme Court just this term, amply covers this and similar
situations. Sex-segregated sanitary facilities rest on unique physical characteristics of the sexes.
ERA Central What is the Stop ERA Movement and Why Are They Saying All Those
Terrible Things About Us?, note 84 supr.
It is unclear that this rejoinder adequately answered opposition's claims, which were
that the ERA would not permit any differential treatment based on sex, whether or not it
rested on unique physical characteristics. See, e.g., G. Whittenberg supra note 69, at 42.
Moreover, those whom proponents most needed to persuade did not consider the argument
frivolous, and trivializing their perceptions was a questionable strategy. A more constructive alternative might have been to add a brief explanation that Congress had clearly
intended to permit sex-segregated facilities. For the relevant legislative history, see S. Rep.
No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 12 (1972).
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acterizing their target as the "unisex amendment.""' 6 That label proved
impossible to discard. To be sure, some supporters, such as Catharine
MacKinnon, attempted to present the ERA's vision of equality as "an
eradication not of gender differentiation but of gender hierarchy." " 7 But,
for the most part, that distinction was inadequately explicated or
absorbed. I"1In Illinois, as elsewhere, observers continued to perceive the
amendment as a tool to "nullify

.

. distinction[s] between the

sexes," '" and to "force us into a gender-free society." '2 From opponents'
perspective, the amendment's projected prohibitions, especially those
regarding preferential treatment in military, employment, and domestic
contexts, ignored sex-linked characteristics that were biologically determined or culturally desirable.
For example, the supposition that women could perform well in
combat struck many Americans as physiologically and psychologically
untenable. Among them was Illinois state legislator Webber Borchers,
who insisted that women's "inadequate hip structure" and "tender feet"
would not enable them to move rapidly or keep pace on long marches."'
And unlike men, who were by instinct "hunters and warriors," women
116. That characterization found favor with academics and publicists alike. See, e.g.,
Timmeech, supra note 2, at 54 (quoting Professor Philip Kurland); G. Whiuenberg, supra
note6.9, at 54.
117. Or, as MacKinnon added, the issue is not "gender difference, but the differencegender
makes" in the current social order. C. MacKinnon, The Future of Women's Rights 2,3 (Mar.
16, 1982) (Unpublished Statement from a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly, Stanford Law
School). See also MerrideuJesseJackson Backs ERA, Chi Trib., May 25,1975, at 8, col
6 (quoting Jesse Jackson) ("most arguments against the ERA arise from 'equality' being
incorrectly equated with 'sameness' ").
118. In prt, proponents' difficulties in articulating their position may have reflected a
general poverty of theory among liberal feminists. Seegenerally E. Janeway, Man's World,
Woman's Place. A Study in Social Mythology 229-33 (1971); and C. Degler, Revolution
Without Ideology The ChangingPlaceof Women in America, in The Woman in America
193,204 (R. Ufton ed. 1964). Difficulties may also have stemmed from ambivalence within
the feminist community as to the appropriateness of sex-linked role patterns in a just
society. See J.B. Elshtoin, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political
Thought 241-48 (1981); Jaggar, On Sexual Equality, 84 Ethics 275, 275-78 (1974);
Femininity, Masculinity and Androgyny (M. Vetterling-Braggin ed. 1982); and sources
cited infra in note 261.
119. DARHits Satanism,Sex Equality, Chi. Trib., Apr. 18,1974, § 2, at7, col 1 (quoting
denunciation by Daughters of the American Revolution at their 1974 convention).
120. Schipper, supra note 7, at 88 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
121. Royko, supra note 110, at 12. To underscore the significance of the hip deficiency,
Borchers recalled from his own World War II experience how a German woman soldier had
been "cut right in hall" by a machine gunner. "Because of her hips, she couldn't run the way
a man could." l4 As to the foot problem, Borchers hypothesized that when female soldiers
lagged behind, their male comrades would have to "stop and pick them up .

. .

. [They]

will do that because it is natural for Ithem] to want to protect women[, b] ut it will hamstring
the infantry." Id
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were "gentle creature[s]" who could not "press the attack.""' Other
legislators conjured visions of mothers in combat while their husbands
"scrub[bed] floors" and children learned "a new version of 'When
Momma Comes Marching Home Again'.""I
Although neither proponents nor the press were inclined to take
such arguments seriously,' 4 many members of the public entertained
similar concerns. Opponents who testified before state legislative committees frequently echoed the sentiment of one Minnesota activist: "We
don't want to turn our daughters into tigers and our sons into pansies.
Nature did not intend men and women to be equaL""11 It was this
fundamental perception about sexual differences that Schlafly and her
compatriots successfully exploited. In their characterizations, the ERA
became an assault on deeply-rooted notions of masculinity, femininity,
and the family.
In the world as Schlafly and other anti-ERA leaders conceived it,
men and women assumed unique roles, dictated by biology and sanctified
by scripture. For women, the prime responsibility and greatest achievement was motherhood; for men, it was earning a livelihood. Or, as
Schlafly herself once summarized the argument: "Women have babies so
men should support them." 2' Biology as destiny was an incontrovertible
premise, not to be'shaken by occasional murmurs to the contrary:
Marriage and the home [are] the greatest' liberation for
They may say they like
It's what they want ....
women. ...
their job and they want a career and all that. And oh sure I knowthey say they like all kinds of intellectual things and all that. But
there is something they will not do that men must do-make
everything take second place to their careers . . . . For women
home and family come first . . . . They can't help it, [t] hat's the

way they are."'
An irony that proponents might have noted was the United States
Supreme Court's use of precisely the same argument in denying women
122. Id. See also note 108 supra, for discussion of military servicewomen's alleged
propensity for temper tantrums.
123. R. Eisler. supra note 62., at 11 (quoting Georgia Rep. N.W. Larsen).
124. For example, Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko concluded his account of
Rep. Borchers' views by noting that the Representative had just completed constructing a
backyard bomb shelter. Added Royko: "I forgot to ask him if he put in separate
washrooms." Royko, supra note 110.
125. Women.: Troublefor ERA, Time, Feb. 19, 1973, at 22 (quoting M. Olsen).
126. Loercher, Equalityfor Women Stalled?, Christian ScL Monitor, Feb. 15, 1973, at 6,
col. 2 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
127. Wittner, All Women's LiberationistsHate Men and Children, Chi. Trib., May 20,

1973, (Magazine), at 22 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
In some respects, arguments predicated on women's presumed contentment in solely
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entry to Ms. Schlafly's chosen profession. In 1872, in upholding Illinois'
refusal to admit women to the bar, Justice Bradley reasoned:
[TJhe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman . .

.

. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are

to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to
the general constitution of things . .. ."'

A century later, opponents entertained similar views. Women's
domestic destiny had strong religious, cultural, and biological underpinnings. American women were a privileged caste, "beneficiaries of a
tradition of . . . respect . . . which dates from the Christian age of
chivalry [and] [t]he honor and respect paid to Mary, the Mother of
Christ."' 2 9 Unlike the Soviet Union, where "equal rights" obligated
domestic roles seemed reminiscent of the half-truths underpinning the "myth of the happy
slave." See A. Montagu. Man's Most Dangerous Myth 186-89 (5th ed. 1974). Yet it also
bears emphasis that claims regarding the immutability of gender differentiation are more
empirically grounded than those regarding racial distinctions. Among the most useful
distillations of primary research bearing on the biological and cultural determinants of
gender roles are HochschildA Review of Sex Role Research, 78 Am. J.Soc. 1011 (1973);
L Frieze, J.Parsons, P. Johnson, D. Ruble, & G.Zellman, Women and Sex Roles: A Social
Psychological Perspective (1978); F. Maccoby & C. Jacklin, The Psychology of Sex
.Differences (1974); M. Rosaldo & L Lamphere, Women, Culture and Society (1974); S.
Weitz, Sex Roles: Biological, Psychological and Social Foundations (1977).
concurring).
128. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
For comparable patriarchal sentiments, see Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in
which the Supreme Court sustained maximum labor limitations for female factory workers
on the theory that "history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent on man
• . . her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in
view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect
her." Id. at 422.
As late as 1961, the Supreme Court was still predicating decisions on the basis of
women's special place at"the center of home and family." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62
(1961) (upholding jury registration system that automatically included men but exempted
women unless they volunteered). Hoyt was effectively overruled in Taylorv. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 535 n.17, 537 (1975), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1975).
129. P. Schlafly, "/at'sWrong with 'Equal Rights'for Women? 5 The Phyllis Schlafly
Report, Feb. 1972, no. 7, at 1. The press frequently reprinted that statement. See, e.g.,
Timmesch, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly). See also Hearingson S.J. Res. 61
and S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary,91 st Cong., 2d Seas. 4 (1970)
(statement by Sen. Sam Ervin):
When he created them, God made physiological and functional differences
between men and women . . . . From time whereof the memory of
mankind runneth not to the contrary, custom and law have imposed on men
the primary responsibility for providing a habitation and livelihood . . .
to enable wives to make the habitations home and to furnish nurture, care,
and training to their children during their early years . . . . The physio-
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women to place their babies in state-run kindergartens while they
performed heavy manual labor, including garbage collection, 13 0 American women were fortunate indeed:
In America, a man's first significant purchase is a diamond for his
bride, and the largest financial investment of his life is a home for her
to five in.... Mankind has not discovered a better nest for a lifetime
of reciprocal love."'
Under this perception of conjugal bliss, all worked smoothly if men and
women adhered to their accustomed roles. As one opposition group
described the arrangement, in the pledge its women members made to
their husbands: "You make the living and we'll make life worth
32
living."
This was the arrangement the Equal Rights Amendment threatened. In explaining his core objection to the ERA, Congressman
Emmanual Celler posited:
men and women are as different as a horse chestnut and a chestnut
horse . . . . Vive la difference.'"
He spoke for a more substantial constituency than proponents may have
appreciated. Assumptions dismissed by legal and feminist communities
as outmoded stereotypes were embraced by large and vocal audiences.
The Equal Rights Amendment seemed an assault on those assumptions
and those who held them. According to one Chicago resident:
I enjoy being a woman and I'm sure 90% of other women feel the
same. I don't want to dig ditches as women in Russia do . . .. As

far as I'm concerned the passing of the Equal Rights Amendment
would mean the downfall of womanhood. I
logical and functional differences between men and women constitute the
earth's important reality.
130. P. Schlafly, supra note 129, at 3.
131. Id at 1. For seminal accounts of the cult of domesticity among American women, see B.
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963); and Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 18201860, 18 Am. Q. 151 (1966). See generally B. Roszak & T. Roszak Masculine/Feminine:
Readings in Sexual Mythology and the Liberation of Women (1969); Broverman, Vogel,
Broverman, Clarkson, Rosen & Krantz, Sex Role Stereotypes: A CurrentAppraisal,28 J.
Soc. Issues 59 (1972).
132. Happiness of Womanhood, Inc., supra note 46,at 1.
133. Elkins, Social Order and the Equal Rights Amendment, in California Commission,
supra note 16, at 217 (quoting Congressman Celler).
134. Wolfe, Only 24 Words in Equal Rights, but Millions of Words About It, Chi. Trib.,
Apr. 1, 1973, § 1, at 33, coL 2 (quoting Letter to the Editor of the Chicago Tribune). See
also O'Reilly, Every Woman has Become a Feministin Her Own Way, ChL Trib., June 27,
1982, § 2, at 1, coL 3 (quoting an unidentified Oklahoma opponent) ("I want to be the lady
in the family .... Of course I expect equal pay.").
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So too, other opponents grimly predicted that, under the ERA's
regime, women would relinquish all traditional prerogatives of their sex.
That the amendment, by its terms, encompassed only state, not private,
action was a legal nuance lost on many observers. Once granted equal

rights, women could anticipate paying for their own meals, carrying their
own packages, and coping unassisted with doors.' 33 It was to avert such
results and to defend "femininity, masculinity and chivalry"' "6that many
anti-ERA organizations dedicated their efforts. Indeed, the names of
opponent groups frequently intimated their members' views on this
point, for example, Feminine Anti-Feminists, GiGi Gals Galore Against
the ERA, Winsome Wives and Homemakers, and Women Who Want to
Be Women.'"
Equally in need of defense was the family. To the John Birch
Society, "[u] Itimately what [the ERA] comes down to is an attack on the
family, the building block of our civilization."' 3 Other opposition
spokesmen, including Schlafly, sounded similar themes, which were
quickly echoed by various religious and right-wing political leaders.
Under their analysis, the Equal Rights Amendment, with its denial of
gender difference, its presumed tolerance for homosexuality, and its
abrogation of laws protecting homemakers, was an assault on the very
fabric of society.' This would, in turn, lead to "unhappiness, and
135. G. Whiuenberg, supro note 69, at 42, projected these consequences for women in
gmsaurants and grocery stores. An unidentified female state legislator cited concerns about
doors as the sole explanation for her opposition to the amendmenL J Boles, supra note 2, at
6. During the Congressional ratification debates, Senator Ervin also raised questions
regarding female telephone operators" exposure to obscene language. See 118 Cong. Rec.
9531 (1972).
136. Happiness of Womanhood, Inc., supra note 46, at 1.
137. Other organizations included American Women Already Richly Endowed; Happiness
of Motherhood Eternal (HOME); Humanitarians Opposed to Degrading Our Girls;
Housewives and Motherhood Anti-Lib Movement; Right to Be a Woman; and Women for
Maintaining the Differences Between the Sexes and Against the ERA. For a fuller catalogue,
see J. Boles, supra note 2, at 200-02.
138. Loercher, supra note 126, at 1, coL 2 (quoting John MacManus, spokesman for the
John Birch Society).
139. See discussion at text accompanying notes 67-80 supr. Opponents frequently
assumed that the ERA would license homosexual marriages. See e.g., G. Whittenberg,
supra note 69, at 18 (referring to ERA as the Homo Amendment); J. Boles, supra note 2, at
5 (remarks of Jaquie Davison, president of Happiness of Womanhood). The legal predicate
for that assumption is questionable. See 118 Cong. Rec. S9331 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972)
(statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (suggesting that states must simply treat lesbian and
homosexual marriages in uniform fashion); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d
1187 (1974) (holding that state equal rights amendment did not require recognition of
single-sex marriages). But see R. Lee, A Lawyer Looks at the Equal Rights Amendment 6465 (1980) (arguing that homosexuals could well prove to be "among the principal
beneficiaries of the ERA").
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increasing rates of divorce . . . desertion . . . alcoholism, suicide
and possibly sexual deviation." 40
Thus conceived, the ERA was a natural target for conservative
animus from almost every quarter. Depending on the critic, the amendment' s sponsors assumed different, but invariably sinister, guises:
emissaries of Satan, 4 ' co-conspirators in a campaign "to destroy our
[American] way of life,"' 42 or "a bunch of bitter women [liberationists]
seeking a constitutional cure for their personal problems."' 43 Such
attributions touched responsive chords in a wide array of audiences.
Given its alleged effects on motherhood and morality, the ERA was
an obvious rallying point for religious organizations, particularly
Catholic women's and fundamentalist groups. Although surveys and
public statements revealed a substantial degree of support for the ERA
among Protestant and Jewish leaders, 44 they were far less active in
mobilizing participants than were the Catholic and fundamentalist
spokesmen who opposed ratification. In northern industrial states, such
as Illinois and New York, various Catholic organizations recruited
members to fight the amendment, often by linking it with other volatile
issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and the related evils of a "singles
society."'14 In southern and western states, some fundamentalist and
140. ERA-Selling WomanhoodShort, 14 Christian Crusade Weekly, Mar. 10, 1974, at3
(quoting J. Pincus, Professor of Neurology, Yale Medical School). See also Letter to the
Editor of the Chicago Tribune from Robert Dalehide (Apr. 6, 1975) (crediting F. Gilder's
Sexual Suicide with the observation that "the proposed ERA would unduly favor and
promote a 'singles' society and weaken the basic family structure," and adding that "[a]
singles society is most susceptible to mental and serious criminal disorders"). "
141. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 52, at60 (remarks of Bunny Chambers, head of the Pro.
Family Forum, and Oklahoma City Bible class teacher) (The ERA struggle is "not a battle
between men and women, or women and women. This is a battle between God and Satan.").
Other opponents characterized the true portent of the amendment's acronym as "Evil Rules
America." J. Boles, supra note 2, at 7.
142. Loercher, supra note 126, at I (quoting John Birch spokesman John MacManus).
143. Wittner, supra note 127, at 21 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
144. For a compilation of the religious organizations on record as supporting or opposing
the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972, see ERA Support Project, The Church, Religion and
the Equal Rights Amendment (1978). See also Changing Church Roles for Women,
Christianity Today, Sept. 27, 1974, at 42 (citing survey of 250 "denominational leaders" in
which three-quarters of respondents favored the amendment).
145. For an account of the efforts by Catholic churches and societies to defeat the amendment in New York, see Swidler, Catholics and the ERA, 103 Commonweal 585 (1976).
Those involved in the Illinois ratification struggle testified to similar efforts. See J.Boles,
supra note 2, at 107-08; Shanahan, Equal Rights Test is Near In Illinois, N.Y. Times Mar.
2, 1975, at 4, col. 5 (noting that church groups feared the ERA would bring abortion as well
as looser sexual standards, and that opposition by individual priests seemed to influence
certain key Illinois legislators).
Schlafly herself frequently linked the ERA with abortion. See, eg., P. Schlafly, The
Power of the Positive Woman 89 (1977); Schlafly, What's Wrong With Equal Rightsfor
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Mormon leaders played a similar role. For example, a survey of anti-ERA
activists in Texas revealed that sixty-six percent were members of
fundamentalist churches (as compared with eight percent for the state as a
whole), while ninety-two percent reported that religion was "very
important" to them.'" 6 For many of these women, and their Catholic
allies, the ERA challenged role distinctions embedded both in church
doctrine and in vital social institutions.147
To the extent opponents viewed such institutions as under siege, the
ratification struggle also assumed important political dimensions. Particularly in southern and southwestern states, conservative leaders
frequently identified the ERA as yet another assault on states' rights, and
recalled the federal government's enforcement of comparably opentextured mandates in civil rights cases."
Women? 5 The Phyllis Schlafly Report. Feb. 1972, at 2,4; Wittner. supra note 127, at 16
(remarks of Phyllis Schlafly); 1. Boles, supra note 2, at 107. However, proponents and
prominent Catholic church leaders repeatedly denied any connection. See, e.g., Is Godfor
the ERA, Ms., May 1982, at 102 (interview statement by The Most Reverend Michael F.
McAuliffe. chairman of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on the
Status of Women in Society and in the Church) ("[t]he ERA will not condone abortion. It is
absolutely essential to separate the issue of abortion from ERA. I am opposed to abortion
and I am unequivocally in favor of the ERA.") See also Felsenthal, supra note 26,at 157
(remarks of Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe) ("I have concluded that adoption ofthe
amendment would have no effect whatever on the power of the states to regulate abortion.").
Such predictions have not. however, dissuaded plaintiffs from relying on state ERAs to
challenge abortion funding cutbacks. See id (discussing effort by Massachusetts Civil
Liberties Union to enjoin cut-off of state funds for abortions).
146. See Brady& Tedinsupra note48, at 573,575;Selling ERA ToMormons, Newsweek.
July 13, 1981, at 26. For a general profile of women involved in various conservative
crusades, including the anti-ERA campaign, see A. Dworkin, Right-Wing Women (1982);
and J. Bernard, Women, Wives and Mothers: Values and Options 165-95 (1975).
147. For a summary of the ways in which Catholic liturgy, publications, and organizational
hierarchy reinforce women's subordinate status, see generally M. Daly, Beyond God the
Father (1973); M. Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (1968) (citing, inter alia, the
exclusion of women from sanctuary and policy functions, and the characteristics, such as
submission and motherhood, ascribed to appropriate female role models). See also S. de
Beauvoir, supra note 97. at 586 (noting how the Catholic Church reinforces -male guardianship" while sanctifying female passivity).
Fundamentalist spokesmen and followers have emphasized similar values. See generally Brady & Tedin, supra note 48, and sources cited therein. Among the most publicized
statements reflecting the fundamentalist view of equal rights was that of a Montana legislator, who informed his colleagues that if God had wanted women to be equal, he would have
had six female apostles. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 6. Some female opponents expressed
similar views. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 134, section 2, at 1,col. 3 (remarks of an
unidentified Oklahoma homemaker) ("And the Bible says the man should be the head of the
family"); A. Dworkin supra note 146, at 117 (remarks of Mississippi opponent) (under the
Equal Rights Amendment, women would have to assume equal responsibility for decision
making and for money, contrary to the will of God).
148. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 61 (remarks of Kenneth McFall, executive
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Extremist right-wing organizations imbued the amendment with
still more subversive overtones. Despite the Communist Party's official
opposition to the ERA, the John Birch Society conceived the amendment
as an integral part of the "Communist plans . . . at work in a now vast
49
effort to reduce human beings to living at the same level as animals."'
Other opponents, less certain about the ERA's conspiratorial origins,
nonetheless perceived it as promoting a "communistic way of life." 1 0 As
evidence for such assertions, some opposition leaders quoted Marx,
Engels, and Lenin on the "liberation of women,""' or invited their
audiences to draw the appropriate historical inferences:
What is liberation? Ask women in Cuba. Castro "liberated" Cuba.
Remember?" '
Among some constituencies, the ERA fell victim to a general
backlash against the radicalism of the 1960's.' Proponents' call for
equality and emancipation rekindled fears, if not of revolution, of severe
dislocations in a congenial way of life. To those who accepted prevailing
norms as more than transitory social artifacts, the feminist platform
appeared profoundly disquieting.
So too, as the comment linking liberation and Cuba suggests, the
opposition was able to unite diverse conservative constituences by
invoking one all-purpose scapegoat, women's liberation. In essence, the
strategy was grounded on two assertions: that "women's libbers" were
secretary of the Oklahoma Farm Bureau) ("Civil rights was an area of states' rights until the
1950's. We didn't want Congress to have any more rights to enforce, especially this kind of
vague [equal rights] law."). See also DAR Hits Satanism, Sex Equality, supra note 119, at
7, col. 1 (statement of Daughters of the American Revolution), J. Boles, supra note 2, at 170
(discussing fears in Georgia that the amendment would lead to more Supreme Court
decisions like Brown v. Board of Education).
149. The John Birch Society Bull., May 1973, at 25. An explication of the Communist
Party's views appears in Ristorucci, Why We Oppose the ERA. PoL Affairs: J. Marxist
Thought & Analysis, Mar. 1976, at 8. Under pressure from women members, the
Communist Party muffled its reservations in the late 1970's. See R. Eisler, supra note 62, at
34.
150. Letter to the Editor of the Chicago Daily News from Eileen Condon and eleven
cosigners (Feb. 1973). For comparable statements from those involved in the Georgia
ratification struggle, see J. Boles, supra note 2, at 108.
151. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 108 (quoting unidentified Georgia spokesmen). See also G.
Whittenberg, supra note 69, at 57 (quoting from the Soviet Union's Constitution
guaranteeing "equal rights" for women).
152. O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 60 (quoting from The Pink Sheet).
153. Clearly, however, the anti-feminist movement had much deeper historical roots. As
William Chafe notes, since the 1920's, "no issue has divided women's organizations more
than the Equal Rights Amendment." W. Chafe, supra note 9, at 112. Much of the early
opposition to the ERA paralleled contemporary sentiments in its ideological and rhetorical
cast. See id. at 112-32, and sources cited therein; A. Kessler-Harris, supr note 12, at 206.
10.
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pursuing radical and amoral objectives, and that the ERA was a product
and hence a legitimation of those ends.
From the outset of the ratification struggle, Schlafly missed few
opportunities to vilify her adversaries:
Their motive is totally radical. They hate men, marriage, and
children. They are out to destroy morality and the family. They look
upon husbands as the exploiters, children as an evil to be avoided
(by abortion if necessary), and the family as an institution which
4
keeps women in "second-class citizenship" or even "slavery."1
According to Schlafly, these "radical and nihilistic" aims were "plainly
stated" in the movement's own manifesto, namely Ms. Magazine."' In
short, "[w] omen's lib is a total assault on the role of the American Woman
as wife and mother, and on the family as the basic unit of society."'1 6
It was equally apparent to Schlafly that this pernicious social
movement was the driving force behind the ERA. The long list of nonfeminist organizations and political leaders that had supported it were
unworthy of notice. Rather, the amendment was:
an example of how a tiny minority can cram its views down the
throats of the majority .

. .

. A noisy claque of women's lib

men into
agitators rammed ERA through Congress, intimidating the 15
voting for it so they would not be labelled "anti-woman." '1
Even more to the point, ratification would constitute an unequivocal
endorsement of feminist views and values. Accordingly, it was essential
for the real "majority of American women" to make their voices
heard:
[I] et's not permit these women libbers to get away with pretending to
154. Schlally, The Right to Be a Woman, 6 The Phyllis Schlaily Report, Nov. 1972, at
4.
155. Id at 4. See also Schlafly, supra note 145, at 4. In her 1972 Report, Schlafly offered
the following analysis of that year's spring issue of Ms.:
It is anti-family, anti-children, and pro-abortion. It is a series of sharptongued, high-pitched whining complaints by unmarried women. They view
the home as a prison, and the wife and mother as a slave. To these women's
libbers, marriage means dirty dishes and dirty laundry. One article lauds a
woman's refusal to carry up the family laundry as "an act of extreme
courage." Another tells how satisfying it is to be a lesbian.
...The principal purpose of M&'s shrill tirade is to sow seeds of
discontent among happy, married women so that all women can be unhappy
in some new sisterhood of frustrated togetherness.
Schlafly, supra note 145, at 3-4. That same Report also contains a capsule account of the
Bitch Manifesto, from an unspecified issue of Woman.
156. Schlafly, supra note 145, at 4.
157. Schlafly, The Fraud Called the Equal Rights Amendment, The Phyllis Schlafly
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speak for the rest of us. Let's not permit this tiny minority to degrade
the role that most women prefer.'
That Schlafly's call to arms proved so effective should hardly have
been surprising. As de Beauvoir noted, many women "confined within
the conjugal sphere" will prefer to envision their domain as less "a prison
[than] a realm"; for them it becomes the "center of the world and even its
only reality." 1"9 A social movement that disturbs such entrenched conceptualizations will necessarily invite backlash. American feminism was
no exception; as noted earlier, most members of the public did not view
women's liberation in a positive light.'"0 In denouncing radical feminists,
Schlafly was preaching largely to the converted. And to a considerable
extent, the strength of her appeal lay in weaknesses of the women's
movement itself, most notably in its perceived deprecation of traditional
family values and their adherents.
For women with no real career aspirations, particularly full-time
housewives or occupants of low-status jobs, feminism represented an
obvious threat. Women who had conceived their role primarily or
exclusively as homemakers found Schlafly's rhetoric flattering and
reassuring, it exalted their values and ennobled their station. By contrast,
feminist ideology implied that these women had made the wrong choices
and demanded reappraisal of their self-concepts, priorities, and way of
life.
That message was understandably unwelcome in many quarters.
For some, it seemed to come too late. Those who had followed traditional
paths resented the assault on their views and status. The ERA afforded a
vehicle for venting their frustration and reaffirming their sense of

importance and influence in a changing social order. 16' Once family and
Report, May 1972, at 4.
158. Schlafly, supra note 145, at 4.
159. S. de Beauvoir, supra note 97, at 424. See also M. Astell, Reflections on Marriage
(1700) (women "are for the most part wise enough to Love their Chains"), quoted in
Mitchell Women andEquality, in The Rights and Wrongs of Women 379, 390 (. Mitchell
& A. Oady eds. 1976); J.S. Mill, The Subjugation of Women in J.S. Mill & H. Mill, Essays
on Sex Equality 227 (A. Rossi ed. 1970) ("[a] woman born to the present lot of women and
content with it, how should she appreciate the value of self-dependence?").
160. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
161. Upset and Raab attribute engagement in right wing politics as a reaction "against the
displacement of power and status accompanying change" by groups that are declining in a
"felt sense of importance, influence, and power as a result of secular endemic change in the
society." S. Upset & W. Raab (1971) (suggesting that much anti-suffragist activity was
attributable to concerns over status); Gusfieldsupra note20, at 185 (analyzing Prohibition
as a struggle over a legal "symbol of social power and status"); H. Lasswell, Psychopathology
and Politics 195 (1960) (discussing the "catharsis function" of symbolic political

actions).
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feminism were fixed as the relevant poles of debate, many women could
be expected to rally around the symbol by which they had ordered their
own priorities.
For other women, whose lives were more in flux but whose actual
opportunities appeared limited, feminism demanded an assumption of
personal responsibility for their future that was more disquieting than
liberating. Compared with the familiar values and well-defined role
models that Schlafly espoused, the feminist alternative seemed unclear,
unsettled, and unreasonably demanding. For some, the fears of failure
and uncertainties of choice made liberation an uncongenial
objective."62
So too, particularly for individuals in lower socio-economic
brackets, the fundamental aspirations and assumptions of the women's
movement seemed out of phase with daily realities. To those lacking
adequate employment skills, mobility, or child-care arrangements, the
feminist preoccupation with professional achievement seemed elitist and
irrelevant. In the view of one Illinois opposition leader, the ERA
proponents were "BPWers [members of Business and Professional
Women organizations] and oddball feminist types who put work before
family.""' Their ratification campaign reflected a "selfish" attempt to
advance their own career interests at the expense of the majority of
women, who, if they worked at all, held "menial" and part-time jobs.'"
162. See Introduction, California Commission, supra note 16, at 14; C. Heilbrun, supra
note 38, at 32-33.
163. Interview with Darlene Deginhardt, supra note 45. Deginhardt's claim was not without
factual basis. For example, a 1974 survey of NOW members revealed that only 17% listed
"homemaker" as their primary occupation. Seventy-eight percent of respondents were
employed, 66% held college degrees, and 30% had advanced degrees. A quarter of the
sample were "professionals"; an additional quarter were teachers or students. Only 8% of
NOW members were clerical workers, although women in such positions accounted for 35%
of the female work force at the time. See J.Freeman, supra note 43, at 91-92. For
comprehensive profiles of the membership of major feminist organizations, see M. Carden,
The New Feminist Movement (1974).
164. Id. The point was echoed elsewhere. See, eg., Van Gelder, supra note 81, at 68
(remarks of J.Kaplan) ("Only a small percentage of women make it big in their
careers . . . . Most of us just want to add to the family income. I just do my little
."). See also Arrington & Pyle, Equal Rights Amendment Activists in North
job ....

Carolina, 3 Signs 666,673 (1978) (finding that ERA opponents in North Carolina tended
to be housewives and were less well-educated and more likely to be married to men in lowerstatus occupations than proponents); L Howe, supra note97, at 216-17 (reporting evidence
that non-professional women express high levels of satisfaction with even mundane
domestic tasks).
For general comparisons of the occupational expectations and values among blue collar
and professional women, see M. Komarovsky, Blue Collar Marriage 49, 56 (Vint. ed. 1967);
and A. Kaplan &J. Bean, Beyond Sex-Role Stereotypes: Readings Toward a Psychology of
Androgyny 276 (1976).
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By devaluing family-centered and avocational pursuits, the "liberation"
movement appeared to endorse an alternative as confining as the
domestic stereotypes it sought to supplant. According to several New
York opponents:
[the feminist ERA sponsors] make it seem like you have to be one
way and only one way to be liberated . . . . If I want to do the
dishes, why should I feel guilty about it . . . . Women lib.
165
bers . . . don't come down to the common level ....
I know [feminists] are intelligent women but Idon't [think] they put
enough value on the feminine role in the home. The woman who
stays home is preparing the next generation but that's not respected.
They don't even value volunteer work. I just don't [think] they've
tried to reach women in general.'"
As those observations suggest, the failure of the Equal Rights
Amendment was in some measure a failure of feminism, at least as
presented to the public over the last two decades. There were, of course,
other causes, including resistance to change in general and women's
advancement in particular. But without doubt, some constituencies were
unnecessarily alienated by feminist polemics and priorities. For many
women, it was ERA opponents rather than supporters who appeared to
offer real choices. It was Schlafly who conferred dignity and significance
on a domestic role that society as a whole has undervalued. Moreover, in
the critical early phases of the ratification struggle, proponents often
seemed unable to appreciate, let alone allay, the concerns underlying
opponents' symbolic appeals.
Although Schlafly's efforts to "whi[p] up sentiment against radical
16
libs" 7 were plainly apparent, many proponents seemed oblivious to the
effectiveness of that strategy. To be sure, a few of the more politically
astute supporters crisply rebutted their adversaries' claims by noting that
ERA supporters included President Nixon and Mayor Daley, scarcely
165. Van Gelder, supra note 81, at 68 (quoting Barbara Goldstein).
Sociological research has also revealed resentment among working class housewives
towards a perceived "attempt by Lib leaders to tell other women what they ought to do, feel,
be proud of, or ashamed about" as wives and mothers. R. Coup, S. Green, & B. Gardner, A
Study of Working Class Women in a Changing World 103 (1973).
166. Van Gelder. supra note 81. at 67 (quoting Lilly Newman). See also Nemy, supra note
93, at 32, col. 2 (remarks of Elinor Guggenheimer, Commissioner of New York City
Department of Consumer Affairs) (criticizing the "negative NOW attitude on volunteerism").
Schlafly herself credited the "general women's lib assault on the homemaker," as the critical
factor animating many opponents. Margolis, BillFailedas Women Succeeded, Chi. Trib.,
June 27, 1982, § 2, at 2, col. 3 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
167. Interview with Esther Saperstein, cosponsor of the ERA in Illinois, supra note 79.
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card-carrying members of "women's lib."'1' Too often, however, proponents accentuated rather than undercut the perceived linkage between
the Equal Rights Amendment and radical feminism.
For example, in early 1973, under the auspices of the Chicago
Women's Bar Association, ERA Central organized a press conference
with an eye to counteracting STOP ERA's assertion that "the supporters
of the amendment are a bunch of man-eating harpies."" 6 ' To this end, they
scheduled brief pro-ERA statements by three suburban housewives, an
airline stewardess, and a Playboy bunny. It is doubtful that the event
accomplished its stated objectives. Journalists predictably treated it as a
lark-the ChicagoDaily News account, titled A Bunny Hops on Rights
Issue, opened its narrative by noting that "[t] he first Playboy bunny to
speak out on the Equal Rights Amendment went hop hop hop Wednesday
for ERA."'1 70 Worse yet, when a reporter inquired of the bunny, who
ostensibly was present to exemplify positive sentiment toward men,
whether she ever discussed equal rights with her customers at the
Playboy 7Club, she replied: "No, they are a perfect example of
pigism." 1
Similarly, as that press account reflects, proponents may not have
made sufficient efforts to dissuade journalists from painting the amendment in radical feminist hues. Since most newspaper editors favored the
168. For example, Jill Ruckelshaus, wife of then Cabinet member William Ruckelahaus,
noted in her testimony before the Illinois House subcommittee hearings:
We hear the charge that E.R.A. is an arm of the women's lib [movement].
Quite ridiculous. President Nixon is no member of women's lib . . . [and

he] strongly supports [the measure].
Equal Rights Wins Approval of House Committee, Chi. Trib., Mar. 23, 1973, § Al, at 4,

col. I (quoting Jill Ruckelshaus).
Similarly, Illinois House cosponsor Giddy Dyer, when facing "outrageous opponent
claims" that the amendment would invalidate laws on sex crimes, snapped back. "President
Nixon and Mayor Daley are for the ERA. Would they want to wipe out rape and prostitution
laws?" Interview with Giddy Dyer, in Chicago (Aug. 18, 1973).
169. A Bunny Hops on Rights Issue, Chi. Daily News, Feb., 1973, at 34.

170. IdL
171. Id.
So too, proponents' acceptance of financial coutributions from the Playboy Foundation did not pass unnoticed. For example. in a presentation for the 1978 Illinois League of
Women Voters Legislative Day, Schlafly orchestrated an original vocal composition
beginning:
Here comes Playboy cottontail.
Hopping down the bunny trail
Trying to buy the votes for ERA
Telling every girl and boy
You can only have your joy
By becoming gender-free or gay.
C. Felsenthal. supra note 4, at 243 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
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ERA, 7 2 they might well have proved sympathetic to supporters' need to
distance the issue from an unpalatable social movement. As it was, media
accounts seemed to buttress Schlafly's claim that the amendment was a
product of women's liberation. A representative sample of 1972-1973
Chicago newspaper stories includes: Woman Against Lib; Women's Lib
Along with Women's Lib; and Pin-Up Gals
Fight Tougher;,Marching
173
Law.
Lib
Fght
As the ratification campaign wore on, proponents profited too little
from prior mistakes, often failing even to recognize them as such. Midway
through the struggle, a few prominent feminists began to acknowledge
needs to diversify the movement's leadership, alter its image, and
broaden its support among nonprofessional constituencies.17 4 On the
whole, however, such perceptions were not widely shared by those
orchestrating the ERA campaign. While national leaders were commissioning public relations fir-ms to enhance the amendment's appeal,"'7
local ERA supporters were busy entrenching unpalatable stereotypes.
Denunciations of opposition leaders and legislators frequently appeared
strident, patronizing, or patently offensive.' 7 6 Many proponents seemed
172. See J. Boles, supra note 2, at 110-11, 138 (noting, inter alia, the editorial
endorsements of the ERA by major urban newspapers). See, e.g., the Chicago Daily News
editorial coverage of state legislative actions, Setbackfor Wolnen's Rights, ChLi. Daily News,
May 19,1972, at 10, col. 1. ("The [legislators'J debate, with its tired cliches, ribaldry, and a
maudlin tribute to motherhood missed the point entirely."); see also The Mossbacks Wiin
Again, ChL Daily News, Apr. 6. 1973, at 12, col. 1 (editorial quoted in text accompanying
note 202 infra).
173. The respective selections are from Chi. Trib., Feb. 7,1973, § 1, at 12, coL 4; ChL Trib.,
Feb. 1. 1973, § 2, at5, coL 1; Chli. Trib., May 28, 1972, § Al, at5, col. 3; and Chli Daily
News, Apr., 1972.
174. For example, various supporters advanced such suggestions after the amendment's
defeat in New York in 1975. See. e.g., Nemy, supra note 93, at 32 (quoting Betty Friedan)
("(Recognition onJ the worth ofeither spouse in the house . . . [has] been drowned out by
the rhetoric of revolution. . . . Too many people in the movement are talking to
themselves. There's a self-hypnosis going on."); id.(quoting Elinor Guggenheimer,
Commissioner, New York City Dep't of Consumer Affairs) ("We have very effective
leaders . . . but the leadership (also] should include women with whom various segments
of the population can identify."); id.(quoting Elizabeth Harris, president of the Women's
Forum) ("We've argued as though all'women were terribly depressed and suffering ....
And we haven't emphasized the word 'choice.' The woman who chooses to stay home
(quoting Murial Fox, founder of NOW) ("Our biggest
shouldn't feel threatened by us."); id.
forward thrust should be to communicate our priorities to housewives and blue collar
workers. . . . We have to . . . listen to what they are saying.").
175. See Madison Ave. Equality, Nat'l Rev., June 25, 1976, at 666 (reporting that major
advertising firms had been hired to make the ERA"respectable");A MarketingBlitz to Sel
EqualRights, Bus. Week. Apr. 19,1976, at 146 (quoting Vel Ranken, creative directorand
vice president of Ogilvy and Mather) (describing $230,000 media campaign treating the
ERA as a "product with a problem").
176. See, eg., Van Gelder, supra note 81, at 68 (characterizations of ERA supporters by
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to dismiss the unpersuaded as unworthy even to participate in the debate.
If male, the opponent was a misogynist; if female, she was incompetent to
recognize her own interests.'
So too, decisions to assign more militant ERA supporters a highly
visible role in the campaign may have overshadowed othir efforts to
expand support for the amendment. Rallies prominently featuring
lesbian and socialist workers' groups, or feminists like Gloria Steinem
who demanded "revolution not just reform," '" s were hardly likely to
convert the uncommitted. To some ERA supporters, participation by all
wings of the movement was an important matter of principle,'M but it
came at a high political price. As one local lobbyist observed, "you don't
bring

Gloria

Steinem

to

Georgia. .

.

. It

was

counter-

productive." 80
In retrospect, one of the most striking aspects of the ERA debate is
the persistency with which proponents misdiagnosed their own difficulties. From their vantage, the obstacles to ratification were all of others'
making. "What went wrong," according to the president of NOW's New
York chapter, "had nothing to do with image. .

.

. We came across as

little ladies in white gloves politically. The opponents used fear, distortion, outright lies and scare tactics.""' To national NOW president
Eleanor Smeal, the real culprit was the Republican Party. 5 2 Other
New York opponent J. Kaplan) ('braless types, lesbians, marching types, and just hostile.
nasty, bitchy, wrong women interested in wrong things."); J. Boles, supra note 2. at 88
(remarks of unidentified opponents) ("rude," "profane." "women but not ladies"); see aLso
ILCoup, S. Green & B. Gardner, supra note 165, at 103-06 (reporting objections by
working class housewives to feminists' marching. picketing. rough language, etc.). For
discussion'of the offensive tactics giving rise to such charges, see discussion at text
accompanying notes 232-35 infra.
177. For examples of such characterizations, see notes 185, 186 and 235 info.
178. Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 140 (quoting Gloria Steinem).
179. According to Bebe Smith, vice president of Georgia NOW, the organization's
leadership was unwilling to request groups such as the Atlanta Lesbian Feminist Alliance
and the Socialist Workers Party to remain in the background: "It was a matter of principle
for me. A few years ago NOW was considered to be too radical. I was not going to be apart of
telling other groups that they couldn't participate." Wohl, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting Bebe
Smith).
180. Wohl, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting Doris Holmes, chairperson of the Georgia League's
Committee on the Legal Status of Women). President Carter's analysis of the 1974 ERA
defeat in Georgia carried the same implication:
There's been some confusion between ERA as such and the Women's
Liberation people. Instead of looking at ERA as a way to guarantee women
equal employment opportunities, they look on it as a movement by the Gay
Liberation Front or Gloria Steinem and other more liberal and exotic
characters to destroy proper relationships between husbands and wives.
J.Boles. supra note 2, at 107 (quoting Jimmy Carter).
181. Nemy, supra note 93, at 32 (quoting Carol De Saram).
182. See Hunter, Leaders Concede Loss on Equal Rights, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1982, at
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supporters variously ascribed responsibility to "big business,"'

3

right

wing extremists,18 self-hatred or stupidity among women opponents,"'a
6
and rank sexism among male legislators."S
Such ad hominems reflected an unhappy mix of tunnel vision and
wishful thinking. Too often proponents assumed that the public was
simply deceived. In fact, it was deeply divided. The source of opposition
that conservative leaders tapped was more deeply rooted than feminists

A13, col I (remarks of Eleanor Smeal) (the Republican party "actually led the attack"
against the amendment); see also Egler In Illinois, a Roller CoasterHistory with Thrills to
the End, Chi. Trib., June 27, 1982, § 2, at 2, coL 2 (remarks of Eleanor Smeal) ("[Tjhe
reality is that the Republican party is cheating women's equality. They are totally
responsible for this.") (referring to June, 1982, Illinois Senate defeat).
183. Langer, Why Big Business is Trying to Defeat the ER& The Economic Implications
of Equality, Ms., May 1976, at 64 (attributing blame to leaders of major business interests
in the country, particularly those representing insurance companies or corporate managers
concerned about the "costs of equality").
During the last months of the national campaign. NOW ran full-page ads in leading
newspapers titled Will the ERA be Sacrificed for the Insurance Number Came? O'Reilly,
supra note 52, at 61. A spokesman for the American Council of Life Insurance, however,
denied "lift[ing] a finger, covertly or in any setting, to oppose ERA. Indeed a great many
people in business support the ERA." Toufexis, What Killed EqualRights, Time, July 12,
1982, at 33 (quoting Robert Waldron, American Council of Life Insurance spokesman).
184. See notes 40-41 suprm.
185. Van Gelder, supra note 81, at 68 (remarks of Ann Giordano) (recounting New York
proponent's statements about "what kind of a stupid ass would vote against her own
rights"); California Commission, supra note 16, at 5 (viewing ERA opposition as reflective
of women's "self-hatred" and their "psychological defense mechanism to inequality and
poor self-image"); J. Boles, supra note 2, a 87 (quoting proponents' views of adversaries as
"naive," "misguided," and incapable of independent thought). See also O'Reilly, supra
note 52.
Such characterizations were indicative of a bias embedded in much contemporary
feminist ideology and organizational structures. As Jean Bethke Elshtain has suggested, the
"elaboration of the feminine mystique led to facile explanations about the true and false
images of the feminine and ushered [in] a rather breezy elitism whereby women who were
already privileged by education and class could impose upon other women their own
analysis of other women's discontents." J. Elshtain, supra note 118, at 250. See also The
Feminists, Dangers in the pro. Woman Line and Consciousness-Raising,in The Other
Half Roads to Women's Equality 203 (C. Epstein & W. Goode, ed. 1971), and note 163
supra.
186. See e.g., MacNeil-Lehrer Report supra note 35, at 2 (remarks of Kathy Wilson,
president of the National Women's Political Caucus) ("[(1 ur feeling is that the ERA did not
ratify because there was a small contingent of legislators from rural America, basically, who
were . . . categorically opposed to equal rights for women."). For attributions of blame
encompassing a broader geographic constituency, see, eg., Wohl, supra note 36, at 57;
Herbers, Women Turn View to Public Office, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1982, at 37, coL 4
(remarks of Eleanor Smeal, president of NOW) (singling out "the stag-club atmosphere" in
state legislatures as cause of non-ratification); O'Reilly, supra note 52, at37 (attributing the
ERA's defeat to the majority's complacency, the opposition's superior organization, and the
fact that "too many people, both men and women, dislike women").
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generally acknowledged. Anti-ERA sentiment was a reflection not simply
of reactionary hysteria or rank sexism, but rather of fundamental
ambivalence about the meaning and value of formal equality in a context
of societal inequality. As the ratification struggle wore on, it should have
been apparent that much of the public found family and femininity more
compelling symbols than equal rights. Yet this was a conclusion feminists
declined to confront.
Ironically enough, the most effective aspect of opposition strategies
was not the deception they practiced on the general public, but the selfdeception they encouraged among proponents. The presence of Schlafly
and other convenient scapegoats deflected attention from fundamental
problems of feminist ideology-its perception of social roles and its
prescriptions for social progress. By the same token, the fixation on
opponents' misstatements and conservative pedigrees obscured the need
for practical politics as well as ideological introspection. Particularly
during the crucial early stages of the ratification campaign, before antiERA sentiment had crystallized, proponents missed numerous opportunities to demonstrate that they, not Schlafly, spoke for the American
public. It is to those failures that Part III is addressed.
II1.

The Legislative Response

Analyzing the legislative dimensions of the equal rights campaign
presents methodological difficulties common to much social science
research. Politicians' votes reflect a variety of ideological and prudential
concerns that are never fully accessible to conventional empirical
techniques. Nonetheless, a variety of primary and secondary source
material casts some light on the personal attitudes, public pressures, and
parliamentary strategies that shaped the ratification process.
A PersonalIdeologies .
Disentangling the ideological roots of legislative behavior is a
particularly complex and conjectural enterprise. Although proponents
frequently attributed ERA defeats to politicians' sexist sentiments, the
evidence for such attributions is hardly conclusive. Political rhetoric
rarely provides a complete account of personal motivation. Moreover, an
issue with the ERA's emotional freight is likely to accentuate divergences
between actual and professed concerns. The arguments voiced in public
forums may more frequently have been rationalizations than rationales
for particular votes. Even so, those arguments are instructive, if not for
-what they conclusively establish about legislators' motives, at least for
what they reveal about the range of politically acceptable bases for
decision making.
For the most part, the arguments that legislators advanced closely

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 1:1

tracked those put forward by major pro- and anti-ERA organizations. The
most common instrumental objections centered on laws granting women
preferential treatment. In justifying their opposition to constituents,
many lawmakers submitted that the amendment would "actually take
away more rights from women than it would give."'8s7 More specifically,
opponents singled out protective labor policies, support obligations, and
draft exemptions as the most significant benefits that the ERA would
jeopardize."
That those issues proved particularly crucial is unsurprising, given
the constituencies and backgrounds of most state legislators. To some
politicians, especially those from rural or industrial working-class
districts, the amendment appeared to be the handiwork of a few elitist
feminists, preoccupied with "liberation" and oblivious to the more
immediate needs of female farm and factory workers.'8 9 Even those
representing wealthier constituencies found it difficult to square the
ERA's egalitarian mandate with deep-seated protective and chivalric
sentiments; woman's "natural superiority should not be demeaned by
law."'" Many may have believed, as Schlafly repeatedly asserted, that
the American people supported "real public officials" with the courage to
187. Letter from Rep. Richard F. Kelly, Jr. to Mrs. Sonia McCallum, ERA Central (April
26,1973). Other Illinois legislators expressed similar views, e.g., Letter from Rep. Charles
F. Keller to Illinois Democratic Women's Caucus (May 31, 1982) ("I feel that most laws
today are for the benefit of women and I feel that they should remain that way"); and sources
cited in notes 188-89 infra.
188. See, e.g., Letter from Ralph Capparelli to Illinois Democratic Women's Caucus (June
13, 1972) ("Just a few examples of specialized treatment of women which would be
jeopardized by the amendment are the responsibility of a husband to support his wife and
children, the elimination of protective benefits for women as workers . . . and the
freedom of women from the military drafL');see Davidson, Ginsburg& Kay, The Standard
Underthe Equal RightsAmendmenL"Sex as a ProhibitedCriterion, in Cases on Sex Based
Discrimination 109 (1974) (noting that these three issues have "dominated the legislature").
189. Hyde, The Losses Can Outweigh the Gains, Chi. Trib., June 9, 1972, at 16, col 3
(quoting E. Celler) ("[T] he feminists cavalierly say 'We don't want protection, we want
liberation' I say, tell that to the female farm workers and female factory workers.").
Although the AFL-CIO had originally opposed the ERA, in part because of its alleged
effect on protective labor legislation, the organization endorsed it in 1973 as a "symbol of
commitment to equal opportunities for women." Wohl, supra note 2, at 81. For an account
of unions' role in the ERA campaign, see B. Babcock, A. Freedman, E. Norton, & S. Ross,
Sex Discrimination and the Law 132-33, 181-84 (1975) and sources cited therein. A
seminal account of unions' historic ambivalence concerning rights for working women
appears in S. Anthony, Women's Place in Industry and Home (1932). For more current
analyses, see generally A. Nelson & B. Wertheimer, Trade Union Women: A Study of Their
Participation in New York City Locals (1975); and P. Foner, Women and the American
Labor Movement: From World War I to the Present (1980).
190. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 189;, see also sources cited in note 192 infra.
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protect women, not the"wimps who hide behind phony symbol[s]."99As
one Illinois representative put it, "I am for equal rights but not for equal
responsibility."' 92
Support obligations offered a case in point. Legislators who worried
about the issue seemed largely impervious to the extensive volume of proERA literature outlining the limits of current support responsibilities and
the availability of sex-neutral alternatives. In proponents' view, this
failure of communication was more a function of politicians' personal
biases than inept advocacy. As one congressional ERA sponsor noted, a
large percentage of elected representatives were relatively affluent
married men with nonworking wives."' 3 For many such legislators, the
reservations of housewives appeared more pressing than the aspirations
of feminists.
But the issue animating the broadest cross section of the legislature
was the draft. Equality in the work place was one thing, equality in the
trenches quite another. As noted earlier, many of the most evocative
military screenplays emerged from state capitols, as legislators envisioned their daughters sharing barracks or bunkers with hardened
combat troops.'9
There were, of course, other issues. In Illinois as elsewhere, some
legislators invoked the entire parade of horribles that opponents had
assembled. The Equal Rights Amendment would signal the demise not
only of states' rights and sex-segregated shot-put competitions, but of
home, motherhood, and conjugal relationships.19 In tones reminiscent of
191. Senate Gets Equal Rights BiU N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,1983, at 6.coL 2 (quoting Phyllis
Schlafly).
192. Equal Rights Backers May Take Cause to Federal Courts, Chi. Daily News, Apr. 9.

1973, at 3 (statement of Rep. John Krugsman [R.-Pekin]). See also Letter from Richard
Kelly, Jr., supra note 187; R. Eisler, supra note 62, at 11 (statement of Georgia Rep. D.
Matthews) (the ERA would "lower our ladies down to the level of men").
193. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jan. 19, 1975, (quoting Martha Griffiths).
194. For accounts of the manifold dangers presented by female hip structures, field latrines
and so forth, see discussion at text accompanying notes 121-24 supra. See also Elmer,
EqualRights Gets State Senate OK,Chi. Trib., May 25, 1972, at 6, col.3 (remarks of Sen.
Robert Eagen) (adverting to his "three beautiful little girls who will be draft eligible at age

18).
195. See, eg., The Mossbacks Win Again, Chi. Daily News, Apr. 6, 1973, at 12, col 1

(noting objections to female participation in shot put); An EmancipationPrecedent, ChL
Sun Times, May 19, 1972, at 12 (remarks of H. Hyde [.-Chicago]) ('an attack on home
and motherhood"); ERA Capitol Conflict, Kankakee Daily Journal, Mar. 15, 1973
(remarks of Sen. Edward McBroom [R.-Kankakee]) (ratification would "devastate
husband and wife relationships"). See also Equal Rights Amendment Fails Twice in

Assembly, Chi. Trib., Apr. 5,1973, at 1, col 3 (remarks of R. Cunningham [R.Lawrenceville]) (the ERA would "signal the unfortunate demise of chivalry . .. [m]en
would be racing women for positions in the lifeboat"). Discussion of the states' rights issues
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apocalyptic anti-suffragist rhetoric, one Peoria representative character-

ized ratification as the prelude to "social disruption, divorce, desertion.
and alcoholism."'"
Although proponents tended to dismiss these claims as pretextual,
their underpinnings may in fact have been somewhat more complex. For
example, while arguments regarding states' rights may not have been
decisive for any legislator, neither were they as patently disingenuous as
pro-ERA spokesmen often assumed. '" In essence, Schlafly. and her
associates framed the issue as a question of power. "Who's going to have
it, the states or the feds?"' N To some legislators, the amendment
represented yet another potential inroad on their declining power and
status. In'the words of one small-town representative: "[w] e have already
permitted the pendulum to swing too far in that direction."" For many

who agreed, the ERA afforded an appropriate occasion to change the
course.

Yet the Equal Rights Amendment threatened legislators' status in a
still more fundamental sense. To many, it loomed as the embodiment of
an ideology that was personally offensive and socially pernicious.
Women's liberation, with its insistence on parity and claims of oppression, challenged not merely their values, but their very identities. Under
the more radical feminist view, these legislators' domestic arrangements
and professional achievements were neither natural nor deserved, but
rather a product of illicit subjugation and false consciousness. Unsurprisingly, many politicians viewed the ERA as an opportunity to respond
occurs in notes 197-98 infra and accompanying text.
For a general treatment of chivalry as a palliative for the injustices of women's social
position. see K. Millet, Sexual Politics 36-37 (1970); and J.S. Mill. supra note 159, at
225.
196. Elmer, supra note 194, at 6. col 3 (quoting Ben Hudson Sours [R.-Peoria]).
Opponents to women's suffrage variously predicted that the vote would lead to divorce,
child neglect, juvenile delinquency, and "race suicide." See A. Kraditor, supra note 49, at
16-18; C. Cat & N. Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics 467 (1923).
197. Both the original ERA sponsors in the Illinois House felt that those who invoked states'
rights had formed their positions by reference to other, often sexist, values and then had
"shopped around for credible arguments." Interview with Giddy Dyer, supra note 168. See
also Interview with Eugenia Chapman, supra note 79.
198. Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 142 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly).
199. Rep. Thomas Miller [IL-South HollandJ, WGN Editorial, Mar. 30,1973, tr.
at 1. See
also Senate Ratie, ChL Sun Times, May 25. 1972, at 13 (remarks of K. Berning [ILDeerfield]) ("a vote for the ERA would further erode states' rights-and I am a strong
believer in and supporter of states' rights"); A. Dworkin supra note 146, at 118 (reportinga
Utah representative's perception that federal endorsement of the feminist program would
restrict her freedom as a legislator, in "violation of states' rights"). See aho K Lee, supra
note 139, at 87-88 (arguing that the loss of state legislative power would constitute a
"significant cost" of ratification).
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in kind, to vent their spleen against the "bra-less brainless broads"200 who
had demeaned their status and impugned their relationships.
Of course, as noted in Part II, anti-feminist sentiments were also
widely shared by women opposed to the ERA. But the rhetoric issuing
from state capitols had a different resonance. On the whole, Schlafly and
her female counterparts depicted a social order in which women were
separate but equal. Many conservative legislators seemed less certain
about the "equaL" A surprising number were quite explicit on the point:
woman's destiny was to "serve her husband";2°1 she would rather be
"loved than liberated." 2°2 According to a poem read into the Illinois
Senate record by one lawmaker with literary aspirations:
Just to be needed is more sweet says she
Than any freedom in this world could be." 3
Such sentiments did not, of course, receive universal critical
acclaim. In the view of the Chicago Daily News editors, the ERA was
"kayoed by a prim little covey of legislators convinced that females were
put on this earth for kuchen and kinder and, by cracky, not much else. " 2°
These press accounts, if somewhat simplistic, nonetheless captured a
significant point about political discourse. Tributes predicated on group
200. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 160 (quoting Rep. Hanahan). Hanahan's views did not
demonstrably mellow over time. When informed that he had been elevated to the "dirty
dozen" hit list of the National Women's Political Caucus, Hanahan responded. "As far as
rm concerned it's a nucleus ofa bunch of idiots. That doesn't make them a political force."
Collin, Tears and Cheersfor End of an ERA, Chi. Trib., July 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
201. Women: Trouble for ERA. supra note 125, at 25 (quoting unnamed Oklahoma
Democrat) ("the good book says a woman should serve her husband"). For a comparable
scriptural exegesis, see note 147supra.See also TroubleforERA, Time, Feb. 19,1973, at
25 (quoting Sen. Guy Hamilton Jones [Ark.]) ("Women are put on this earth to minister to
the needs of miserable men."); and text accompanying note 202 infra.
202. EqualRighsProposalFailsTwice in Assembly, ChL Trib., Apr. 5,1973, at 1, coL 3
(quoting Roscoe Cunningham [R..Lawrenceville]).
203. In full context, the stanza does not improve:
JUST TO BE NEEDED
by Mary Eversley
She always seems so tired is what friends say,
She never has a chance to get awayHome, husband, children, duties great or small
Keep her forever at their beck and callBut she confides with laughter in her eyes,
She never yet fretted by these tiesJust to be needed is more sweet says she,
Than any freedom in this world could be.
LAtter from Sen. Frank Ozinga to Martha Clark (May 2, 1973).
204. The Mossbacks Vin Again, ChL Daily News, Apr. 6, 1973, at 12, col. 1. See also
editorial quoted in note 172 supra.
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status carry different symbolic baggage depending on their source. When
mothers exalt the mystique of motherhood, it appears as an attempt,
however benighted, to enhance status; when such encomiums originate
with males opposed to equal rights, the effect is otherwise. As constitutional theorist John Ely argues, the stereotype may be the same, but the
import is fundamentally different. 203 One regards with some skepticism
the "enthusiasm for women's destiny manifested by men who [presumably] would not for the world have any part of it."2 0'
In any event, what is ultimately most revealing about the anti-ERA
rhetoric is not what it discloses about the biases of particular legislators,
but rather what it suggests about the prevailing ideological climate in state
capitols. The record hardly reaffirms the framers' vision of the ratification
process, conceived as "the most likely means of drawing forth the best
men in the states" to resolve fundamental issues of constitutional
governance. 0 7 Moreover, that so many politically accountable officials
felt free to couch their objections in phrases like "loved not liberated" or
"bra-less brainless broads" evidences more than a flair for alliteration or
facility for grandstanding. Rather, it testifies to the perceived legitimacy
of certain core attitudes about womens' roles and feminist ideology. By
the 1970's, it would have been difficult to visualize even the most racist
politician publicly objecting to civil rights legislation on the grounds that
blacks would rather serve-than-be-served, or that proponents were
nagging-noxious-niggers. Sensitivities to racism and sexism remain on
qualitatively different levels." s
205. J.Ely, Democracy and Distrust A Theory ofJudicial Review 158,164-65,169 (1980)
(discussing the role of self-denigrating and self-aggrandizing stereotypes in sex-discrimination contexts). See generally G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 78 (1954); Brest.
Foreword, In Defense of the Anti.DiscriminationPrinciple,90 Harv. L Rev. 1 (1976).

206. S.de Beauvoir, supra note 97, at xxvL See also M. Wollstonecraft, AVindicationof the
Rights of Woman 100 (C. Hagelman ed. 1967) (1st ed. 1792) ("1 lament that women are
systematically degraded by receiving the trivial attentions which men think it manly to pay
to the sex, when in fact, they are insultingly supporting their own superiority.").
207.2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 93 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (James
Madison quoting Rufus King).
208. As philosopher Richard Wasserstrom suggests with regard to racial jokes, what the
jester generally fails to grasp is "how implausible it is to believe that one can hold these
[stereotypical] views about black people and at the same time deal with them in non-racist
fashion." Wasserstrom Racism, Sexism, and PreferentialTreatment, 24 UCLA L Rev.

581,591 n.19 (1977). Moreover, as Wasseratrom goes on to note, sexism is a more deeply
embedded cultural phenomenon than racism; "[being] less unequivocally regarded as
unjust and unjustifiable, [sexism is] harder to detect [and] harder to eradicate ....
[M] any persons announce, without regret or embarrassment, that they are sexists or male
chauvinists; very few announce openly that they are racists." Id. at 590.
For commentary suggesting the force of Wasserstrom's point even in academic circles,
see Pascal, Why I Oppose the ERA, 4 S.L Rev. 11, 12 (1977) ("The ERA is a manifestation
of . . . libertarian thought. Once men ignore the observable order in being it becomes
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Yet ironically enough, the candor of conservative legislators proved
one of proponents' most effective organizational assets. It was as much the
rhetoric as the results of state ERA campaigns that enlisted large numbers
of supporters in the cause. Sexist sentiments catalyzed a burst of financial
and lobbying support that gave proponents enormous organizational
advantages.2 09 What remains to consider is why supporters could not
capitalize effectively on those advantages, and convince enough legislators that equal rights, if not ideologically congenial, were at least
politically expedient.
B. Public Pressures
The linkage between public opinion and legislative decision
making, however central to democratic theory, is often difficult to gauge
in practice. In this instance, analysis is especially problematic since there
are no systematic data on lobbying efforts. But the mobilization of public
pressure clearly played a crucial role in the ratification campaign. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to sketch at least in broad
outlines the pressures that participants brought to bear on state
legislators.
1. The Opposition's Strategy
No one in suffrage camp credited the "anti-s"
with great effectiveness. Their arguments seemed
too puerile... (But) the antis appearance at
hearings and in print... did furnish legislators
with the excuse that a body of respectable
21
women did not want the vote.
Again, historical parallels are apparent. Not until a constituency of
female anti-ERA activists emerged did a significant number of politicians
join the chorus. It was only the presence of a visible women's lobby that
effectively legitimated male legislators' opposition. 21' One need not fear
impossible to distinguish between male and male, between female and femae, between male
and female, or between human and monkey.").
209. For comparison of membership, financial resources and institutional support
structures of pro- and anti-ERA organizations, see notes 220-21 infra, and accompanying
text.
210. E. Flexner, Century of Struggle. The Women's Rights Movement in the United States
296 (1959). Accord, C. Cat & N. Shuler, supra note 196, at 273.
211. According to Illinois ERA sponsor Dyer, "[a]a long as men were convinced that this
was something all women wanted they would vote for it. But then Schlafly and her followers
came down and gave a rationale for opposition." Interview with Giddy Dyer, supra note

168.
Other Illinois supporters held similar views. Interview with Charlotte Waters, lobbyist
for the National Organization for Women, in Chicago (Aug. 13, 1972) (Schlafly "provided

an excuse"); Interview with Sherwin Schwartz, lobbyist for the Independent Voters, in
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the label "oppressor" when bowing to the demands of the putatively
oppressed.
That opposition leaders managed so quickly to muster a sufficient
show of political force attests to remarkable tactical astuteness. Particularly at the outset of the ratification campaign, before the issue had
attracted substantial media attention, opposition leaders faced enormous
difficulties in marshalling volunteers. As one Illinois opponent
explainedPeople like us have very limited time and it would be against our
nature to go out and organize because our main job-priority is the
fact of staying in the home. If we put that aside . . . we're in effect
doing just what we're fighting against The vast majority of women
are doing what comes naturally to women, being homemakers and
being in the home and they're not political activists.2 '
Opponents' inclination to accord politics a relatively low priority
confronted their leadership with substantial practical problems. A
woman anxious to be home in time "to get supper for my family" 23 ' is
hardly an ideal candidate for a lobbying position. As one frustated Illinois
organizer recalled.
I went to Springfield last year but no one else from my group was
able to go. They all had excuses-child care, one woman's husband
refused to let her go, another was having a rug delivered."
In attempting to surmount such obstacles, Schlafly and her
followers relied on two principal techniques. First, as the discussion in
Part II suggested, they vested the ERA with instrumental and symbolic
dimensions calculated to arouse even the most phlegmatic housewives. In
addition, opposition organizers developed lobbying strategies that were
Chicago (July 25, 1973) ("Schlafly brought down Catholic women [to Springfield] who
made the point that opposition came from women not men").
In some states, the presence of women legislators opposed to the amendment doubtlessly reinforced the legitimacy of anti-ERA votes. For an analysis of the attitudes and
backgrounds of those women, see Ulie, Handberg& Lowrey, V/omen State Legislators and

the ERA- Dimensions of Support and Opposition, 2 Women and Politics 23 (1983).
212. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 123 (quoting unidentified ERA opponent).
213. In commenting on one of the ERA's 1978 defeats, Rosemary Thomson, Director of
Illinois Eagle Forum, stated. "It'sa tremendous national victory for women of traditional
moral values. Now rm going home to get supper for my family." The End of an ERA?
Newsweek, June 19, 1978. at 34 (quoting Rosemary Thomson). In a similar vein, Ann
Patterson, Oklahoma Stop-ERA chairperson, explained the absence of a victory press
conference on the grounds that "we have dishes to do." O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 59
(quoting Ann Patterson).
214. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 123 (quoting an unidentified ERA opponent). See also
Fraker, supra note 36, at 35 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly) (noting opponents' reluctance to
"ruin a lovely weekend at home with their families").
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both attractive to broad constituencies and effective with their state
representatives.
Among the most successful of these techniques was the mass mail
campaign. With remarkably little lead time, Schlafly and her colleagues
were able to generate exceptional volumes of anti-ERA correspondence. 2is Given the profile of the opposition's typical adherent, the
emphasis on mass mail was astute. Compared with other techniques of
interest group politics, letter writing is the ideal vehicle for a constituent
with limited commitment, mobility, and lobbying experience. By enlisting church, Republican, and conservative women's organizations, and
by supplying sample correspondence for the uninspired, opposition
leaders were able to generate a broad-based show of strength.
Of course, insofar as individuals and organizations merely
reproduced the proffered boiler-plate prose, their message lost some of its
potency. As the campaign wore on, legislators became increasingly
irritated at the large volume of letters, which greatly complicated the task
of identifying and responding to individualized correspondence.21' Yet,
despite the prepackaged appearance of many anti-ERA missives, they
frequently proved effective. By drawing attention to the substantial
female constituency that opposed ratification, the mass-mail strategy
convinced many uncommitted legislators that their own reservations
were not only legitimate but politically prudent.
That conviction was buttressed further by a second opposition
technique, an ostentatiously feminine form of personal lobbying. By
example and instruction, Schlafly set the tone for much anti-ERA
proselytizing. In appearing before state legislatures, Schlafly often
dressed pointedly in pink and cast her appeals in accessible, low-key
terms. That approach, widely imitated by her disciples, reportedly sat
better with many state politicians than t7proponents' more strident
presentations and less conventional attire.
within months after the
215. In Illinois, Schlaly had unleashed a flood of letters
amendment's initial introduction. See text accompanying note 27 supre. During 19721973, legislators reported mail running 7 to 1,30 to 1,and 50 to 1 sgainst passage. See ERA
Capitol Conjfc, Kankakee Daily Journal, Mar. 15, 1973; State Senate OKjor Vomen's
Right, Clk Today, May 25,1972. After Schlafly's testimony in Atlanta, letters reportedly
came in at 10 to I against ratification. See J.Boles, supra note 2, at 115.
216. For representative statements by irate legislators, see J.Bole&, supra note 2, at 134-36.
In Florida and Indiana, the flood of anti-ERA mail prompted proponents to offer to filter out
non-constituent. out-of-state, or identically worded missives. See Shanahan, Opposition
Amendmnent on Equal Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1973, at 1, coL 4.
Rises teo
For examples of opponents' suggested texts to state legislators, see G. Whittenberg.
supra note 69, at 71-72.
217. See Wohi, supra note 36, at 55; see also notes 176-200 supra and 233-43 infra and
accompanying text. Schlafly personally conducted workshops for anti-ERA lobbyists,
featuring advice on wardrobe, weight loss, and makeup. C. Felsenthal. supra note 4, at
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So too, Schlafly and her colleagues devised a uniquely domesticated lobbying approach that captured both public and legislative
attention. Many opposition leaders encouraged their followers to arrive in
state capitols bearing gifts of identifiably feminine manufacture, most
often home-baked bread and similar culinary offerings. However,
opponents occasionally varied the presentations with less propitiatory
tokens. One of the more celebrated distributions featured twenty-eight
individually
boxed
and
beribboned
mice,
offered
to
California senators who supported ratification. The point, according to
donors, was that "those who voted for the ERA are mice instead of men
because a real man will fight for a woman."' '
Such contrived displays, like the silver bullets dispensed in Ohio
and the don't-draft-me baby girls described earlier 1 9 were effective in
several respects. This genre of lobbying involved activities with which
many housewives felt comfortable. By creating such participatory
vehicles, opponents were able to recruit women who lacked experience
and interest in more conventional forms of political suasion.
In addition, from a public relations perspective, these techniques
were an inexpensive means of arousing media attention. Although the
magnitude and sources of anti-ERA funding remain conjectural, 22 0 it
appears that opponents were under far fighter budget constraints than their
adversaries. While proponents could obtain organizational and funding
support from many well-established women's associations, opponents
had to rely more heavily on ad hoc volunteer networks and small
individual contributions. 2 2 1 Media events were one way of offsetting
267-68.
218. Men or Mice? Lib Foe Raises Big Squawk. Chi. Daily News, Nov. 11, 1972, at 16
(quoting Happiness of Womanhood member Mrs. Bobbie Boccardi).
219. The silver bullets assertedly demonstrated that women could defend themselves
without an amendment. In a similar vein, Minnesota opponents attempted to"bat away" the
amendment with fly swatters. Troublefor ERA, Time, Feb. 19,1973, at25. Otheranti-ERA
lobbyists provided homemade jams labeled "preserve us from a Congressional jam." C.
Felsenthal, supra note 4, at 248.
Such tactics continue. Borrowing the theme of a recent best-seller, B. Feirstein, Real
Men Don't Eat Quiche (1982). Phyllis Schlafly sent some of same to the 53 senators who
reintroduced the measure in January, 1983. Each quiche bore the label, "Real Men Don't
Draft Women." See A Quiche Gift to ERA 'wps,
San Fran. Chron., Jan. 27, 1983. at 7,
col 1.
220. According to Schlafly, primary financial support for her efforts came from her
husband and her earnings from books, newsletters, broadcasts and lecture fees. Klemearod,
supra note 7, at 45. Although she has declined to disclose details about large donors,
Schlafly has consistently denied allegations of funding from the John Birch organization. A
spokesman for the Society has confirmed the absence of any national support. Wohl, supra
note 2, at 87.
For discussion of the level of Schlafly's anti-ERA expenditures, see note 221 infra.
221. For example, in the final year of the campaign, NOW reportedly spent some
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proponents' greater ability to underwrite mailings, publications, and paid
advertisements.
Finally, the anti-ERA leadership's emphasis on feminized lobbying
strategies had the effect, if not the intent, of maneuvering proponents into
a difficult defensive posture. By playing both to legislators' paternalism
and reporters' preference for style over substance, opponents presented
their adversaries with an unhappy choice. If proponents did not respond
in kind, they forfeited media coverage and left unchallenged opponents'
claim that the battle was one between feminine and feminist camps. Yet to
the extent that they descended to opponents' level of discourse, supporters risked entrapment in a trivialized contest that they could never
win. It was a dilemma that ERA supporters proved unable to escape.
2. The Proponents' Strategy
Of course we're going to get ERA . . . If it
takes white gloves, we'll use white gloves. If it

takes combat boots, we'll wear combat boots. If it
takes white gloves and combat boots, we'll use both.
Ann Scott
Legislative Vice President

National Organization for Women "

"White gloves and combat boots": proponents tried both, but never
found a satisfactory fit. The "white gloves" strategy took several forms.
One approach, more inspired in theory than in practice, was to meet
opponents on their own terrain. The goal was to undercut opponents'
assertion that mainstream women opposed equal rights. Accordingly, the
more moderate pro-ERA leaders mounted their own culinary campaign,
matching their foes muffin for muffin. For example, in 1973, seventy-five
mature housewives assembled to serve eggs benedict to Illinois
Representatives and Senators. Neither the opposition nor the press let the
event pass unnoticed. The day before the brunch, Schlafly and followers
distributed small loaves of home-baked bread to all the legislators,
labeled "Let us stay in the kitchen." M Unsurprisingly, this juxtaposition
proved irresistible to reporters. In their accounts, the affair became a
playful internecine contest among rival hausraus. Rights Battle Booms
$15.000,000 nationally. whereas Schally acknowledged national expenditures of only
$100,000, in addition to some $100,000 in PAC candidate contributions. O'Reilly. supra
note 52,at 59. See also note 34 supra. Many other women's organizations, such as the
National Women's Political Caucus. the League of Women Voters, and local business and
professional women's associations, gave significant monetary and in-kind assistance. By
contrast, anti-ERA efforts were frequently orchestrated from opponents' homes or church
basements, and their financial outlays were far more modest
222. WohLd supra note 2. at 98 (quoting Ann Scott).
223. ERA CapitolConflict. Kankakee Daily Journal, Mar. 15, 1973.
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From Kitchens, chortled the Chicago Daily News.' 2' The Tribune's
narrative, Women Try To Cook Up Votes, began:
Women on both sides of the fight over ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment appear to have decided that the way to a
legislator's vote is through his stomach.22
Responding to one reporter's query, an irate ERA supporter observed
icily that "this brunch was planned a month ago and was not an attempt to
show that liberated women can cook as well as unliberated ones." 226What
the event was originally designed to show was somehow lost in the
translation.
Undaunted by these jocular press reviews, proponents continued to
offer variations on the same theme. Legislators across the nation absorbed
a barrage of breads, pastries, valentines, tea roses, forget-me-nots, and
the like. 22' Many recipients appeared more bemused than moved. The
gestures seemed "unprofessional"; they made moderate supporters
appear "impractical lady do-gooders." 2 8 Worse still, the strategies, as
caricatured by the press, made the amendment seem unworthy of serious
substantive debate. Although pro-ERA leaders were quick to deplore the
journalists' dismissal of the ratification campaign as a "teacup
quarrel,"22 proponents' own tactics unquestionably invited such portrayals. In an era when political campaigns have become increasingly
' The inpersonalized, the media's response was hardly surprising. 30

224. Rights Battle Booms from Kitchens, ChLi. Daily News. Mar. 15, 1973, at 34.
225. Women Try to Cook Up Votes ChL Trib., Mar. 1, 1973; see also Wolfe, ERA Given
Boost at State Breakfast, ChL Trib., Mar. 15, 1973, § 2, at 9, col. 1.
226. Women Try to Cook Up Votes, supra note 225.
227. See ERA Marches On To Another Loss, Time, May 26, 1980, at 23 (home-baked
bread); J. Boles, supra note 2, at 124 (cookies with the message "Be Our Valentine");
Valentinesfor Legislators, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1973, at 33, col. 8 (red carnations and
valentines); Mitchell, ERA Payola Roses and Pies ChL Trib., Apr. 17, 1974, at 7, col. 1
(Schiafly and followers distributed apple pies bearing notes"My heart and hands went into
this dough. For the sake of the family, please say no!" while ERA advocates presented roses
to legislative supporters with the message "You are a sweetheart to support the Equal Rights
Amendment.").
228. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 113, 130, 132-33 (quoting unidentified legislators).
229. Letter to the Editor of Chicago Tribune Magazine from Sonia McCallem (June 8,

1973).
230. As Muray Edelman has argued.
If political acts are to promote social adjustment and are to mean what our
inner problems require that they mean, then these acts have to be dramatic in
outline and empty of realistic detail In this sense publishers and broadcast
licensees are telling the exact truth when they excuse their poor performance
with the plea that they give the public what it wants. It wants symbols and not
news.
M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics 9 (1964). To expect the press to underscom
substance at the expense of side shows misunderstands the "limited nature of the news, the
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evitable, if unintended, consequence of proponents' quiche and cookie
crusades was to trivialize the issue. Such tactics helped create a climate
31
that made ratification debate an occasion to "let off steam and relax,"
rather than to confront serious questions of sex-based discrimination.
Moreover, supporters taking the "white gloves" tack were repeatedly upstaged by their more provocative colleagues. The radical
feminist wing remained unconvinced that the most direct route to the
legislator's vote was "through his stomach." They pursued a different
path. Public denunciations of adversaries in animal blood, spray paint or
burnt effigies were favored gambits. 11 When animated by a spirit of
giving, militant ERA supporters abandoned any pretense of subtlety.
Among the most publicized offerings were chicken manure (North

Carolina) and a child's potty (Virginia).1 3 Such gestures, however
cathartic for the converted, presumably did little to persuade either the
recipients or their constituencies.
While pro-ERA lobbyists were counseling supporters to be "softspoken," and to "cool the women's fib business,"" u their more assertive
comrades were making headlines by chaining themselves to fences,
" 23
launching hunger strikes, and excoriating their foes as "sexist pigs s
illimitable complexity of society, and our own endurance, public spirit and al.around
competence." W. Lippman. Public Opinion 228 (1950).
231. Interview with Eugenia Chapman, supra note 79.
232. See LentaERA Backers PourBloodon CapitolFoor. Chli. Trib., June26,1982, at2,
coL I ("Nine militant women protestors for the Equal Rights Amendment were arrested
Friday after they went on a rampage in the Capitol pouring blood over the marble floor.
following the Senate's defeat of the Amendment"); C. Felsenthal, supra note 4. at 5
(describing Washington, D.C. rally at which proponents burned Phyllis Schlafly in effigy).
See note 235 infra for further variations on the theme.
233. The manure was for recalcitrant North Carolina legislators. See Macleil-Lehrer
Repor4 supra note 31. at I (remarks of C. Felsenthal). The potty went to Virginia House
majority leader James Thomson. who was chairman of the committee that killed ratification
in 1974. J. Boles, supra note 2, at 125.
234. Shahanan Stiff Fght Looms Over Ratification of Equal Rights Amendment
N.Y.Times. Jan. 29, 1974. at 15, coL 1 (quoting Mrs. Burton Truman). Proponents were
also informed that blue jeans were not the preferred apparel in capitol rotundas. Id.
235. Seventeen women, comprising the "Grass-Roots Group of Second Class Citizens,"
chained themselves to railings in front of the Illinois Senate Chamber until they were
forcibly removed four days later. The goup then staged a series of sit-ins and disruptive
tactics in the state capitol Nine women were arrested. See Egler,In llinois a Roler-Coaster
fissory with Thrills to the End ChL Trib., June 27, 1982. 1 2, at 2, col. 1. Van Gelder,
ElectoralPoliticsor CivilDisobedience, ML,Jan., 1983, at 38,39. In the spring of 1982,
seven women fasted for 37 days, convening in the Illinois capitol rotunda under a banner
titled "Women Hunger for Justice." Ii
"Pig" remained the denomination of choice in many feminist circles. The Broward
County Florida NOW staged a carnival featuring a Pin-the-Tail-on-the-Male-ChauvinistPig game, while their "Southern Belle" sisters in Louisiana spray-painted the word "pig" on
the homes of two New Orleans legislators. J.Boles, supra note 2, at 7,125.
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Even the more charitable press accounts tended to portray such tactics as
"childish" pranks; one account, with its emphasis on a fasting group's
total 226% pound sacrifice, seemed reminiscent of a Weight Watchers'
23
advertisement. 6
Although more moderate ERA proponents attempted to dismiss
these antics as the churlish posturings of a few extremists, that effort
received a serious setback in 1977. Live on national television, delegates
to the International Women's Year Conference in Houston warmly
endorsed the ERA-along with abortion, gay rights and a host of other
controversial planks and placards (e.g., "Mother Nature is a Lesbian").237
Just in case any legislator from a non-ratifying state had missed the
festivities, Schlafly thoughtfully mailed everyone a full account. 3I Other
anti-ERA leaders brought home conference souvenirs for display in state
capitols to ensure that no one could overlook the connection between
equal rights, vibrators, and sex education in the public schools.23' 9 The
point was widely appreciated. According to one Illinois representative
who had switched his vote after the conference, "the resolutions adopted
there [show] what these people think the ERA stands for . . . . I can't
tolerate those things-and neither can my constituents."" °
To be sure, it may have been unrealistic to expect leaders of a highly
heterogeneous social movement to have muzzled conference participants
for the sake of the ERA's public image. At thatjuncture, many doubtless
believed that the image was already hopelessly compromised. Nonethelebs, the event did raise broader questions about feminists' seemingly
self-defeating priorities. At the same time movement leaders were
investing enormous energy and financial resources in a campaign to
secure mainstream support for the ERA, they were also orchestrating
telegenic theatricals that inevitably undercut that effort.
Then too, there were marches. Often the marches culminated in
rallies featuring a varied assortment of celebrities: former presidents, film
stars, and feminist leaders. Such demonstrations did, of course, serve
several useful purposes. They revived flagging spirits, aroused the
complacent, and generated members and money."' But all that came at a
236. See Van Gelder, supra note 235, at 39.
237. For a fuller description, see Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 140.
238. I
239. O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 59 (discussing Oklahoma anti-ERA organization's display
of Houston materials).
240. Felsenthal, supra note 26. at 140 (quoting Edward Blathardt [R.-Shiller Park]).
241. One of proponents' greatest difficulties, particularly during the early 1970's while the
momentum for ratification seemed strong, was to convince passive supporters of the need
for more tangible assistance. As Peter Hart pollster for liberal Democratic candidates, noted
after the June, 1982 deadline expired, "We now have a society which is sexually integrated.
The average woman saw that and it made her [unwilling to] be a crusader," Margolis, Bill
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cost. Mass convocations not only evoked unsettling images of radical
feminism,2" 2 but also diverted the leadership's attention from the more

mundane aspects of grass roots organizing. While supporters were
marching, opponents were making phone calls and enlisting volunteers in
key legislative districts. In commenting on these divergent priorities, one
Florida state senator noted, "As far as I know, neither Marlo Thomas nor
Alan Alda nor Jimmy Carter votes in my district."2 3

That point was eventually brought home to ERA supporters. As the
campaign wore on, proponents became increasingly adept at the less
splashy aspects of interest-group politics. Pro-ERA leaders focused more
on boycotts and ballots, less on brunches and playboy bunnies.
According to one Illinois organizer, "We've learned we must hit our
legislative opponents where it hurts-their candidates, their bills."' "
But in key states, that lesson came too late. 245 Once opponents had
Failedas Women Succeeded, Chi. Trib., June27,1982, § 2, at 1, coL 1.See also O'Reilly,
supra note 55, at 37.
The efficacy of marches in arousing the phlegmatic varied considerably across
jurisdictions. Proponents in Illinois, aided by the overtly sexist comments of some state
legislators and the constant physical presence of Schlafly, had strong turnouts throughout
the campaign. For example, in 1980, thousands converged on Chicago, while only 500
turned out in a New York City march. Compare Thousands to Come to Chicago for
NationalERA March May 10, Nat'l NOW Times, Apr. 1980, at 1, col. 1,with B. Friedan,"
supra note 32, at 26.
242. Supporters were advised that a 1976 Chicago rally drawing an estimated 12,000
people from 30 states would simply "reinforce the ERA's association with radical women's
liberationists." J. Boles, supra note 2, at 126. See also text accompanying notes 178-80
supra.
243. Felsenthal, supra note 6, at 141 (quoting Jim Scott).
244. Pro-ERA Women Drop the Lady-like Tactics, Chi. Today, July 9, 1973, at 27
(quoting Mary Ann Lupa). See also MacNeil-LehrerReportsupra note 35, at 3 (remarks of
Kathy Wilson, president, National Political Caucus) ("Ithink . . . we've come around to
the conclusion . . . that we need to do less marching and more grass roots."); Wohl, supra
note 2, at 86 (remarks of Karen Coolman, Florida NOW coordinator).
In addition, proponents sought to bring economic pressure to bear on recalcitrant
legislatures by organizing a boycott of conventions in non-ratifying states. See supra note
34. Whether that strategy had the desired effect, or further alienated crucial constituencies,
remains a matter of some dispute. Those opposing the boycott often maintained that it was
irrelevant to the rural legislators who formed the backbone of ERA opposition, and unfair to
the low-paid urban hotel and restaurant workers whose representatives typically supported
ratification. Seegenerally Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 153-54, and sources quoted therein;
Bode, Fellowship and Sisterhood, New Republic, July 19, 1982, at 4.
245. See Margolis, supra note 241, § 2, at 1, col. 2 (remarks of S. Coter, ERA America)
("We did not get to the grass roots soon enough."). See also Toufexis, What Killed Equal
Rights Time, July 12, 1982, at 32, 33 (noting that during the early ratification campaign,
activists "did not seem to know how to find a precinct list or run a phone bank").
As late as 1978, leading proponents were still advocating mass rallies with media
celebrities. See R. Eisler, supra note 62, at 130 (citing list of 52 entertainment luminaries
available for ERA support).
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mobilized a strong public constituency, including many putatively
single-issue voters, supporters' task became more difficult. Unlike
Schlafly and her followers, who often appeared willing to let votes and
campaign assistance hinge solely on the ERA, proponents failed to
establish dependable patterns of reward and punishment. They frequently tied their support to favorable action on other issues, such as
abortion, and overlooked opportunities to compensate wavering adherents for pro-ERA votes. 2"
Also neglected were the parliamentary strategies that might have
made the difference in some crucial contests. As one New York organizer
acknowledged, "[w]e didn't focus on all the Byzantine stuff that goes on in
state legislatures."2 4 7 Had proponents spent less time in public denunciations and more in capitol corridors, there might have been less to
denounce.
C. ParliamentaryStrategies

'o a considerable extent, the ERA's difficulties in parliamentary
circles mirrored those identified above. In part, the problems stemmed
from ideological resistance. Some influential lawmakers were unmistakably ill-disposed toward the concept of equality and its presumptively
feminist pedigree. Once opponents had established respectable grounds
for resistance, these legislators were unlikely to retreat. Other less
ideologically committed politicians seemed responsive to the public

pressures discussed above.
However, especially during the early ERA campaigns, many
legislators had minimal personal investment in the issue and represented
constituencies that were uninformed, unconcerned, or divided. Their

votes were negotiable. The inability of ERA sponsors to bargain
246. See Felsenthal, supra note 26, at 152-53. By almost all accounts, anti-ERA
organizations were more astute and generous in their campaign contributions. Brotman,
The ERA Battle of the Bankrols,Chi. Trib., Nov. 2,1980, § 12, at 1; Jones, The Effect of
the Pro- andAnti.ERA CampaignContributionson the ERA Voting Behaviorofthe8Oth
Illinois House of Representatives, 2 Women & Politics 71 (1982). Through multivariate
analysis of the voting records of Illinois state representatives during 1977 and 1978, the
Jones study concluded that political donations influenced the representatives who changed
positions in the six ERA votes occurring in that period.
For an account of one of proponents' most mismanaged campaign contributions, see
Egler, Three Women with Right Cause, Chi. Trib., June 27, 1982, § 2, at 2, coL 3
(discussing conviction of Wanda Brandstetter, a Chicago businesswoman convicted in
1980 of attempting to bribe a legislator to vote for the ERA).
247. Fraker, supra note 36, at 38 (quoting B. Feigen Fasteau). See also Feminist Cause
Looks Back to Grass Roots N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,1982, at B10, coL 2 (remarks of Koryne
Horbal, Minnesota ERA lobbyist) ("many feminists, like myself, who were party-oriented
and involved in national boards and organizations, found that because we ignored what was
happening in state legislatures, we did not do well....").
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effectively for these ballots proved a critical impediment in many
ratification struggles.

In large measure, the problem was inadequate leadership. By
choice or necessity, proponents found themselves relying on legislative
sponsors who lacked either parliamentary finesse or a strong commitment to the issue. In some states, the difficulty was unavoidable. Politically powerful legislators declined to become identified with the amendment
or withdrew from active sponsorship once controversies arose.24s But in
other states, including Illinois, one or several sponsors deliberately chose
to chart the course unassisted. Frequently, they were women far removed
from power centers in state capitals.2 ' The significance of women's
subordinate position in parliamentary hierarchies is well illustrated by
the legislative history of the Illinois ratification campaign.
As noted earlier, when two female representatives introduced the
Equal Rights Amendment during the Illinois House's 1972 session, they
had offers of cosponsorship from ninety-three male colleagues, a larger
number than necessary for ratification. They declined all such overtures;
not until 1977 were any male sponsors enlisted. 210 The original Illinois
Senate proponent took a similar stance. From 1972 to 1975, when she
resigned her seat, she brought in only one male sponsor. The absence of
more diverse leadership had serious practical consequences, particularly
in view of the female sponsors' limited affinity for political brokerage.
Their continuing ineptitude prompted one proponent to submit that "the
ERA didn't encounter difficulties; its sponsors encountered diffi25
culties." 1
Some of these problems might perhaps have been averted had

proponensW timing been more astute. For example, Illinois representatives would have been well-advised to follow the traditional convention

of holding back a potentially volatile measure until the end of the House
session.2 S2 Concededly, there was no reason to anticipate Schlafly's sudden blitz. Even so, prudence might have counseled postponement,
248. See J. Boles, supra note 2, at 145-48. According to many observers, powerful male
politicians who publicly supported the amendment seldom attempted to "wheel and deal or
twist arms" on its behalf. See ERA- RIP, The Nation, July 3, 1982, at 3; Bode,
supra note 244, at 4. See also note 258 infra (remarks of Eleanor Smeal).
249. For examples, see J.Boles, supra note 2, at 92, 145-48, 167.
250. See text accompanying note 26 supra.This article's analysis of Illinois parliamentary
maneuvers draws from a variety of background interviews with lobbyists, legislators and
members of pro- and anti-ERA organizations, as well as the sources cited in notes 253-59
ifra. The discussion is generally consistent with Janet Boles' case history. See J. Boles,
supra note 2, at 144-48, 150, 154-56, 164-65, 172-73.
251. J.Boles, supra note 2, at 167 (quoting unidentified ERA supporter).
252. As one study of Illinois parliamentary strategies noted:
Controversial bills are passed at the end of a session without as extensive a
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especially since the sponsors were totally unprepared for resistance. No
literature for journalists or politicians had been assembled, let alone
distributed. As a result, when Schlafly unleashed her barrage, legislators
were ill-equipped to weigh the merits of opponents' legal claims. Had
ERA sponsors introduced their bill at the end of the session, Schlafly
might have been less able or inclined to seize on Illinois as a potential
turning point in the tide of ratification.
Tactical maladroitness persisted throughout the ERA campaign.
The amendment frequently fell victim to parliamentary back-biting and
back-scratching. Among the most celebrated instances was one Illinois
sponsor's decision to champion an independent candidate for leadership
of the state delegation to the national Democratic convention. That
gesture did not sit well with then-Mayor Daley, a politician not renowned
for his willingness to forgive and forget. Shortly after the convention
fracas, the ERA came up for a vote in the House. The Senate had already
endorsed the proposal in its 1973 session, and support by Daley
Democrats would have secured passage in the House. That assistance was
not forthcoming. It was scarcely coincidental that seven of the Mayor's
most devoted lieutenants, all of whom had supported ratification the
preceeding year, reversed their position, leaving the amendment seven
votes short of passage. The sponsor herself was philosophical about the
event:
If you permit yourself to be intimidated, it hurts your stature and
efficacy as a legislator. You may bargain and negotiate but you can't
be intimidated. It's a fine line but you must draw it.2"
While many pro-ERA supporters agreed with the distinction, they felt she
had picked the wrong moment to underscore it.I
Comparable timing problems surfaced in other contested states.
Political pique may have been decisive in one well-publicized Tennessee
defeat; 253 in South Carolina, sponsors gained national notoriety for
allowing a vote to proceed immediately after lunch, before several crucial
legislators had returned.21 6 Other sponsors repeatedly miscalculated the
scrutiny as they would receive at an earlier date, and some legislators
deliberately delay pushing certain bills until the last possible moment.
Passage of a bill in Illinois depends, in part at least, on the sense of timing of
its adherents.
G. Steiner & S. Grove. Legislative Politics in Illinois 21 (1960).
253. Interview with Eugenia Chapman. supra note 79.
254. Interview with Esther Saperstein, supra note 167. See also J. Boles, supra note 2, at
167, and sources quoted therein.
255. See Wohl, supra note 2, at 84-85. See also W'omen: The End of an ERA, Newsweek,
June 19, 1978, at 34 (recounting a comparable incident).
256. Rights Amendment Seems Dead.for 75 After New Set Back, N.Y. Times. Mar. 27,
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strength of their support and the repercussions of various parliamentary
maneuvers. Where they did accurately anticipate difficulties, they lacked
the logrolling resources to avert defeat. While such faux pas are
commonplace in any state capitol, the consensus has been that ERA
sponsors in contested states generally displayed singular mismanagement at certain critical junctures.2" 7
But if there is blame to apportion, it should by no means be laid
solely at these individuals' doorsteps. The failures of female proponents
reflect a prolonged exclusion from the political mainstream, for which
they cannot be held accountable. With few exceptions, these women
legislators have remained outsiders, unwelcome intruders in the sporting
and dining enclaves where deals are struck. So too, the unwillingness of
powerful male sponsors to press more vigorously for ratification testifies
to women's general impotence at both parliamentary and grass roots
levels.
If "women's issues" are to assume a less peripheral niche in the
political landscape, their supporters must organize around candidates as
well as causes. Nothing less will ensure a critical mass of elected officials
who are committed to women's concerns, and who can summon sufficient
legislative muscle to make their priorities felt. For that to occur, more
women must become principals rather than accessories in political
campaigns. They must stand for office, build cohesive voting blocks, and
secure a greater share of party nominations and resources.
The point has not been lost on ERA proponents. Shortly after the
ratification deadline passed, the president of the National Women's
Political Caucus observed that, despite women s numerical majority in
the voting population, they comprise only twelve percent of the state
legislators. What became "painfully apparent in the ratification battle is
5
that 12% . . . is not enough."

1975,at 33, col. 1 (describing defeat by vote of 46-43 taken before some key supporters had
returned from lunch).
257. For example, many observers believed that the Illinois speaker's 1973 decision that a
three-fifths vote rather than a simple majority was necessary for ratification was influenced
by actions of the Democratic ERA sponsor, who had run against him for the speaker's
position. See Unger, WFomen's Lib Fight Tougher, CiL.Trib., Feb. 1,1973, § 2, at 5.col 1.
As one anti-ERA leader bluntly acknowledged, that sponsor had "done some stupid things.
She'd helped us tremendously." Interview with Darlene Deginhardt, supra note 45. See
also C. Felsenthal, supra note 4. at 253.
Moreover, in many non-ratifying states, supporters seemed exceptionally uninformed
and ineffectual in the horse-trading maneuvers that preceded key votes. See generally J.
Boles, supra note 2, at 145-66, 168-80. See also Lentz, State Senate Vote Kills ERA, ChIL
Trib., June 25,1982, § 2, at 1,coL 2 (describing ERA backers' surprise at defection of key
supporters in the amendment's final defeat before the 1982 deadline expiration).
258. MacNeil-Lehrer Report, supra note 35, at 3 (quoting Kathy Wilson). In another
interview, Wilson added, "We can no longer be standing on the outside wringing our hands
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If the ERA's defeat has helped inspire and empower women to
redress that imbalance, the struggle may well be vindicated. A twentyfour-word constitutional amendment is more a catalyst than a source of
change. Without a fundamental reordering of American institutions and
values, women cannot hope to achieve true parity in employment
opportunities, economic security, and social status. Both private and
public sectors must attach much higher priorities to a cluster of issues:
adequate day-care, flexible work schedules, comparable pay for comparable worth, extended maternity leaves, support structures for single
mothers, and reforms in pension, tax, credit, and welfare policies. 2" The
prospects for that social agenda hinge far more on political power than
over every roll call vote. We have got to get women in office." Herbers, supra note 40, at 1,
col 1 (quoting Kathy Wilson). Some feminist leaders had reached comparable conclusions
a half-century earlier. See, e.g., E. Flexner, supra note 210, at 326 (quoting Carrie
Chapman Catt). For an overview of the barriers to women's political advancement, see
Costantini & Craik, Woman as Politicians: The Social Background, Personality, and
PoliticalCareers of Female PartyLeaders, 28 J. Soc. Issues 217 (1972).
Of course, a significant number of female legislators also opposed the ERA, though in
smaller percentages than their male colleagues. See Lilie, Handberg & Lowrey, supra note
211, at 32. Thus, the need is not simply to elect women. See Collin, As Symbol, Issue Will
Never Die, Chi. Trib., June 27, 1982, § 2, at 1, coL 5 (remarks of Eleanor Smeal, president
of NOW) ("We will not again seriously pursue the ERA until we've made a major dent in
changing the composition of Congress as well as the state legislatures to include a
significantly larger proportion of women and of men who are genuinely feminists. Next time
we will not be cheerleaders on the sidelines but direct participants in the decision making
bodies."). See alsoNO WSupporting Some Men Instead of Women for Offwe, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 1982, at 68, col. 5.
259. For discussion of the desirability of various options regarding day-care, part-time
employment, maternity leaves, and flexible work schedules, see M. Wade, Flexible Working
Hours in Practice (1973); Rowe, Child Carefor the 1980's: TraditionalSex Roles or
Androgyny?, in Women into Wives: The Legal and Economic Impact of Marriage 169 (J.
Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1977); Hearingson Part Time Employment and flexible Work
Hours Before the Subcomm. on Employee Ethics and Utilizationof the House Post Office
and Civil Service Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. May 24, 26, June 29, Oct. 4,
1977); National Conference on Social Welfare, Families and Public Policies in the United
States, Final Report of the Commission (1978). For a general discussion of work-sharing
plans that might increase the number of jobs available to women with extensive family
commitments, see also Summers & Love, Work Sharingas an Alternative to Lay Offs by
Seniority. Title VI1 Remedies in Recession, 124 U. Pa. L Rev. 893 (1976).
The, rationale for a comparable worth approach to existing male-female salary
differentials is analyzed in note 263 infra. For suggestions regarding means of securing
more adequate child support, see Powers, supra note 17, at 115-16; and sources cited in
note 95 supra.The need for reforms in social security and AFDC programs is reviewed in
U.S. Nat'l Comm'n on Social Security, Social Security in America's Future 225-44 (1981);
and sources cited in note 266 infra.
Given the types of jobs they occupy and their mobility in and out of the labor force,
women are half as likely as men to be covered by pensions. See President's Comm'n on
Pension Policy, Working Women, Marriage and Retirement 31 (1980). For discussion of
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constitutional symbols. Had the ERA sailed smoothly through state
capitols, its proponents would have missed valuable instruction in both
the mechanics of realpolitik and the limits of their own influence. In the
long run, the political truths distilled from the unsuccessful struggle could
prove more enduring than the fruits of an easy symbolic victory.

IV. Epilogue
Less than a year has passed since the latest demise of the Equal
Rights Amendment. With the proposal so recently interred, any sweeping
historical pronouncements would seem premature, even somewhat
unseemly. Nonetheless, the recent resurrection of the text in Congress 2"
prompts a few musings that, depending on one's frame of reference, may
form more a prologue than a requiem.
To those most intimately involved, the ratification struggle has had
all the makings of a medieval morality play. For the opposition, the
allegorical referents were unambiguous. In a contest between decency
and deviance, the champions of family and femininity took arms against a

radical fringe. To opponents, the result was culturally and spiritually
appropriate if not, indeed, preordained.
For many proponents the moral landscape was equally flat; the roles
were simply reversed and the narrative was as yet incomplete. At the close
of Act I, the vanguard of liberation suffered a setback at the hands of a
small reactionary cadre. The 1982 ratification deadline marked only the
intermission. In the final scene, still in preparation, the forces of darkness
will be dispersed and equality will at last be the law of the land.
Neither script is consistent with the analysis developed above.
Even at this limited historical distance, the narrative seems less banal, the
motivations richer, and the outcome more indeterminate than the
principals have acknowledged. Viewing the performance not as a single
set piece but as part of a continuing genre, the denouement suggests
modifications in pension vesting requirements and coverage that might reduce this gender
differential, see U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 15, at 16-17.
One potentially promising statutory approach to many of the issues identified above is
the proposed Economic Equity Act of 1983, S. 888,98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec.
53796 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1983) (providing, inter dia, increased tax credits for child care;
tax incentives for employers who hire divorced or widowed homemakers re-entering the
work force; prohibitions against pension plans that penalize women for taking child-care
leaves; and more stringent enforcement of alimony and child support obligations).
260. Supporters introduced ajoint resolution proposing an equal rights amendment in July,
1982, and again in January, 1983. H.R.J. Res. 534.97th Cong., 2d Seas., 128 Cong. Rec.
H4109 (daily ed. July 14,1982); S.J. Res. 213,97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. S8240
(daily ed. July 14,1982); S.J. Res. 10, 98th Cong., 1 st Seas., 129 Cong. Rec. S529 (daily ed.
Jan. 26,1983); H.R.J. Res. 66,98th Cong., 1at Sess., 129 Cong. Ree. H98 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1983).
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broader questions that do not readily yield allegorical truths. From a
historical perspective, the ratification campaign seems a relatively minor
event in an ongoing struggle over the redefinition of social status and
sexual roles. The results of that process will depend on economic,
technological, and cultural forces to which the ERA's fate will make at
best a marginal contribution.
Even so, the future ratification colloquy will not lack significance as
a social text. From a political and jurisprudential standpoint, the debate
may continue to prove illuminating for what it discloses about the
dynamics of constitutional change; among other things, it may suggest the
limits of meaningful public discourse on legal issues carrying substantial
symbolic freight. From a more sociological vantage, the dialogue could be
instructive for what it reveals about cultural mores and aspirations; in
particular, it may illumine the degree of consensus regarding social
institutions that seek to reinforce or suppress sex-linked differences. 2 6
And finally, from an instrumental perspective, the results may exert some
short-term influence over the continuing reformulation of women's legal
rights and social station.
At this juncture, the shape of the coming ratification campaign
remains very much in doubt. One disquieting possibility is that the same
morality play will be revived, with much of the original script unaltered.
Having spent a decade snarling past each other, proponents and
opponents may now have difficulty conceptualizing their interaction as
anything other than a contest for cultural dominance. In attempting to
establish who speaks for women, neither faction has attended to what
women have in fact been saying.
Throughout the ratification struggle, opponents flailed against their
own caricatures of an androgynous society. Unwilling to accept either the
risks or the rhetoric of liberation, they seized on the Equal Rights
Amendment as an all-purpose scapegoat for encroachments on their
261. For some of the more thoughtful attempts to fashion a theory of sexual equality that
takes account of values traditionally ascribed to women, see E. Wolgast, Equality and the
Rights of Women (1970); Elshtain, The FeministMovement and the QuestionofEquality,
7 Polity 452 (1975); and Rossi, Equality Between The Sexes: An Immodest Proposal,in
The Women in America, supra note 118, at 98.
For counterarguments in favor ofan "assimilationist" society that does not assign ?oles
on the basis of an involuntary and immutable sexual characteristic, see C. Epstein,
Woman's Place (1971); C. Gilman, Women and Economics (1898); La Follette, Concerning
Women, in Freedom, Feminism, and the State 213-35 (W. McElroy ed. 1982); Jagger, On
Sexual Equality,supra note 118; Wasserstrom, Racism and Sexism, Philosophy & Social
Issues 30 (1980). See also Yale Study, supra note 15, at 874 ("As long as woman's [sic]
place is defined as separate, a male-dominated society will define her place as inferior.");
Accord, S. Firestone, The [D]ialectic of Sex 2 (1970). For empirical research bearing on
these issues, see sources cited in note 127 supra.
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values, status, and way of life. After a point, such symbolic baggage
becomes difficult to shed. Many women may remain unable to acknowledge that the feminist demon is largely of their own making.
Proponents, for their part, are no strangers to the arts of selfdelusion. Like the Bourbons, many seem to have learned nothing, and
forgotten nothing, from their defeats. In their zeal to allocate blame among
disingenuous opponents and sexist legislators, they have remained
oblivious to the numerous defects in their own performance. Their
rhetoric frequently vacillated between the overwrought and the unintelligible. Too often, proponents summoned tedious legal exegeses
against arguments that sprang from different roots. Yet, when their
audiences' attention flagged, they responded with precisely the wrong
diversions: culinary crusades, scatological pranks, and personal assaults.
Predictably, the real substantive issues became trivialized and confused,
and doubts among the unconverted were more amplified than allayed.
It is, of course, by no means obvious that different strategies would
have yielded different results. From the outset, proponents confronted
major stumbling blocks; the converted were often complacent, and the
unconverted were wary of change in general and sexual equality in
particular. Even so, proponents' conceptual ambiguities and prudential
errors made them accomplices in the amendment's defeat.
What remains to be seen is whether, after a decade of dialogue, at
least partial truths have been revealed to both sides. The cacophony that
proved so divisive in the short term may yet have more constructive
repercussions. It should now be clear to most participants that to enlarge
their audience they must broaden their appeal. By choice or necessity, an
increasing number of women have become full-time workers and single
heads of households. 262 Those who are employed remain concentrated in
low-paying, low-status jobs that yield few advancement opportunities
and average salaries far below those of male workers.26 3 The vast majority
262. In 1979, 51% of all U.S. women were working or looking for work. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 2080, Perspectives on Working Women: A
Databook 3 (1981). Of younger women, ages 25-34, 64% were in the labor force, id. at 4,
including 54% of the mothers within this age group. Id at 34. Since 1972, more than half of
married women with school-age children have worked outside the home. U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 392 (1977) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Special Labor Force Reports, Table 634 [Married Women in the Labor Force by
Age and Presence of Children: 1950 to 19761). See also note 265 infr.
263. In the two decades that have elapsed since the enactment of Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, which prohibit sex-hased discrimination in employment, see note 14 supra, the salary
differential between full-time male and female workers has not significantly improved. See
Burstein, Equal Employment Opportunity Legislation and the Income of Women and
Nonwhites, 44 Am. Soc. Rev. 367,374-81 (1979). Employed women receive an average of
only 59 cents for every dollar earned by men. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The
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of married women continue to assume primary domestic and child care
responsibilities, which are not easily accommodated within existing
employment structures. Work schedules, benefit packages, evaluation
procedures, and seniority provisions have generally proved unresponparents who seek extended leaves or meaningful part-time
sive to working
6
2

vocations. 4
Moreover, demographic patterns reflect an increasing "feminization of poverty. '2 16 Divorced mothers have experienced enormous

Employment of Women: General Diagnosis of Developments and Issues 7 (Apr. 1980).
Among the primary causes of this differential are the occupational segregation of female
employees and the lower wage scales in jobs traditionally held by women. See id at 6-7; C.
Uoyd & B. Niemi, The Economics of Sex Differentials (1979); A. Stromberg& S. Harkess,
Women Working Theories and Facts in Perspective (1978); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,JobSegregation,and Title VIl ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. 12 U. Mich. J. L Ref.
397, 402-04 (1979); Stevenson, Women's Wages andJob Segregation 4 PoL & Soc'y 83
(1973). Such de facto segregation in turn reflects the lingering imprint of a century of
intentional discrimination and social stereotyping.
To reduce the disparity between male and female earnings, feminists have increasingly advocated concepts of comparable worth, which require that wage scales reflect
analysis of job content rather than prevailing market rates. The merits of that approach are
reviewed in id; Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the 'Comparable
Worth' Theory in Perspectiv, 13 U. Mich. J.L Ref. 231 (1980); Schwab, Job Evaluation
and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in Comparable Worth: Issues and Alternatives
49 (E. Livernash ed. 1980).
The Supreme Court recently reserved decision on possible application of the doctrine
in federal sex discrimination cases. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
(1981). For subsequent developments and analysis, see Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A
Post-GuntherOverview, 69 Geo. U. 1123 (1981).
264. Working wives' disproportionate assumption of family obligations are discussed in J.
Bernard, supra note 146, at 219-20; R. Rapoport & R. Rapoport, Dual Career Families Reexamined 354-58 (1976); and L Hoffman & F. Nye, Working Mothers 55,230 (1974). This
asymmetry in domestic commitments accounts for many women's choice of part-time or
discontinuous employment. Yet by the same token, most work that accommodates flexible
schedules or extended leaves affords little job security, insurance coverage, pension
protection, advancement opportunities, or decision-making responsibility. For analysis of
these structural problems and the range of statutory mandates and incentives that might
improve women's position in the labor force, see L Holmstrom, The Two-Career Family 3986, 153-81 (1973); Frug, Securing Job Equality For Women:"Labor Market Hostility to
Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L Rev. 55 (1979); Scales, Towards A Feminist Jurisprudence,
56 Ind. L J. 375, 438-44 (1981); and sources cited in note 259 supra.
265. In 1975, twenty-one million persons, 13% of all families, were living in female-headed
households. Almost 40% of these families had incomes below the poverty level. U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Women Still in Poverty 1, 18 (1979). Census Bureau figures for
1981 indicate that almost one-half of the families below the poverty level were headed by
women with no husband present. The poverty rate for such families was 32.7%, compared
with 6.2% for married couples and 11% for families headed by men with no wife present.
U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, A Growing Crisis: Disadvantaged Women and Their
Children (1983). See also Facts and figures About /omen and Poverty, San Francisco
NOW Times, Feb. 1983, at 3.
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difficulties obtaining adequate financial support, and single women
dependent on welfare, pensions, or social security assistance have not
fared well in a climate of growing administrative austerity.16 6 Nor have
homemakers lacking independent incomes inevitably received equitable
treatment under the gender-neutral domestic property laws that have
become the norm in most states. " 7 These are deeply rooted social
problems that both opponents and proponents have an interest in
addressing.
The victims of these structural inequalities are not, of course,
similarly situated. Some are members of a transitional generation, now
reluctant to bear the cost of creating "equal" opportunities that they never
enjoyed. Others are victims in other respects. Confronted by daily
reminders of their social and economic disadvantages, many women do
not rank symbolic parity high among their personal objectives. Yet cutting
across such class divisions are issues of common concern.'" Many of
these women share commitments both to family-oriented values and to
institutional structures that will give those values content in the current
social order. A large number want not a choice between domestic roles
and meaningful vocations, but some means of reconciling the two. To
capture this audience, activists must offer substantive programs, not
simply scapegoats or symbols.
If ERA opponents are to conserve feminine traditions, they must
confront the consequences of cultural change. They must offer a plausible
266. For discussion of the problems in enforcing support statutes, see sources cited in note
76 supra. The federal welfare budget of the Aid to Families With Dependent Children
Program was cut from $6.4 billion in fiscal 1982 to $5.4 billion in fiscal 1983. See Office of
Management and Budget, Exec. Office of the U.S. Gov't, Fiscal Year 1983, pt. 5, at 124
(1982). For analysis of the impact of other recent budgetary curtailments on women, see
Women's Research & Education Institute for the Congressman's Caucus, Impact on
Women of the Administration's Proposed Budget (Apr. 1981); Eisenstein, The Sexual
Politicsof the New Right: Understandingthe 'Crisis of Liberalism'forthe 1980's, in N.
Keohane, M. Rosaldo & B. Gelpi, Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology 77, 92-98
(1982).
Single women comprise almost three.fourths of the nation's elderly poor. U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education & Welfare, Social Security and the Changing Roles of Men and Women
168 app. C (Feb. 1979).One of three single women over 65 had an income that fell short of
the poverty threshold. IL at 167-70. For discussion of the way current social security and
pension provisions disadvantage those women, see U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra
note 15, at 14-17, and sources cited therein.
267. See notes 75 and 95 supra.
268. For a critical review of the literature seeking to bridge these divisions and synthesize
Marxist and feminist theory, see MacKinnon. Feminism, Marxism Method, and the State:
An Agendafor Theory, in N. Keohane. M. Rosaldo, & B. Gelpi, supra note 266, at 1; C.
Guettel, Marxism and Feminism (1974). Among the most useful syntheses are Z.
Eisenstein, supra note 22; S. Firestone, supra note 261; and J. Mitchell, Woman's Estate
(1971).
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way for working women, divorced homemakers and single heads-ofhouseholds to fulfill, at least partially, the role they idealize. So too, if
proponents are to become successful advocates for progress, they must
recognize that broad segments of the American public find much worth
preserving in ostensibly archaic feminine stereotypes. For many women,
the "liberated" alternative, grounded in a professional paradigm, has
appeared inaccessible and just as confining as the domestic mystique it
sought to supplant.
In attempting to enlist those women, feminists might do well to
pause in the pursuit of an increasingly divisive constitutional symbol and
focus on more concrete responses to structural inequities. That redirection of effort will, in turn, require sustained pressure not only on
legislatures, but also on unions and employers in both private and public
sectors. And to be successful, the campaign must convince men that
society as a whole has a stake in expanding assistance for working parents
and in renouncing role stereotypes that have constricted opportunities for
both sexes. Obtaining formal rights within existing institutional structures is not sufficient. The objective must be to recast those structures to
accommodate more humane, less hierarchical forms of social experience.
If the ratification debate brought these points home, and equipped
women with the political expertise to make their perceptions felt, then the
process itself may have been more significant than the objectives either
side sought to attain. If there is a hopeful lesson to be distilled from the
ERA campaign, it is that the vast majority of women on both sides of the
issue want equality in some sense: equality in social stature, economic
security, and vocational opportunities. It is to these common aspirations
that the struggle for equal rights must now turn.

